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Abstract
This dissertation strives to understand the short and long-run consequences of
armed conflict. In short-run, as conflict increases, parents are less likely to send
their children to school or take them to health facilities and more likely to keep
them home. Less time in school might translate to more time spent at work for
these children. Coping with conflict can disrupt human capital accumulation of
children and exposes them to adverse experiences, the effects of which can also last
into adulthood. Some of the persistent effects of conflict on educational and health
outcomes have been widely studied in the literature. Nevertheless, relatively
less is known about how these childhood exposures affect adult behavior, beliefs,
and attitudes. One of the goals of this dissertation is to study such long-lasting
impacts of childhood exposure to conflict.
In the first chapter, “Victims of Consequence: Evidence on Child Outcomes
using Microdata from a Civil War”, joint with Giri Subramaniam, we study the
short-run impacts of violent events on child time allocation, curative health-care,
and education. Exploiting the spatial and temporal variation in exposure to
local-level armed conflict, we find that an increase in violent events: (i) leads
to an increase in contemporaneous hours worked by children, with the effect
being substantial for agricultural work; (ii) decreases the likelihood of parents
taking their children to visit a health-care facility to seek curative care; and (iii)
results in a reduced likelihood of attending school, along with a decline in years
of education. Overall, the results indicate that war affected schooling and time
allocation of boys whereas girls were less likely to get curative health-care.
The second chapter of this dissertation, “Do Adverse Childhood Experience
Shape Violent and Abusive Adult Behavior?", is motivated by the fact that family
violence is pervasive and has detrimental economic consequences. Nevertheless,
very little is known about how childhood experiences influence this behavior. In
this study, I explore long-run determinants of family violence by linking exposure
to adverse circumstances in childhood to the perpetration of abuse and neglect in
adulthood. In particular, I examine the effects of men’s exposure to the Nepalese
Civil War (1996-2006) in childhood. Exploiting spatial and temporal variation
in childhood exposure to the armed conflict from ages 0 to 16, I find that ex-
posed men are less likely to perpetrate spousal violence and to display controlling
behaviors. Additionally, children of exposed fathers are less likely to experience
violent disciplining at home. They also work fewer hours per week and are less
likely to be involved in dangerous working conditions.
In the third chapter, “Exploring the Channels”, I study the potential mecha-
nisms that underlie the empirical results established by Chapter 2. I find that
exposed men are more likely to complete secondary schooling, be employed at
skilled non-agricultural occupations, and marry women who are more likely to
have completed primary school and currently working. The most pertinent chan-
nel is that these men are less likely to justify wife-beating in different scenarios.
Next, I assess the implications of the empirical results on the theories of domestic
violence. Existing theories highlight two broader motives for perpetrating do-
mestic violence: “Expressive” and “Instrumental”. Violence is instrumental if it
is used to extract resources from the victim whereas it is expressive if the per-
petrator gains direct non- pecuniary (dis)utility from it. I find that my results
resonate strongly with “Expressive” theories of domestic violence where men who
were exposed to conflict in childhood find using violence at home distasteful.
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CHAPTER 1
VICTIMS OF CONSEQUENCE: EVIDENCE ON CHILD
OUTCOMES USING MICRODATA FROM A CIVIL WAR
[WITH GIRIDARAN SUBRAMANIAM]
1.1 Introduction
Exposure to an armed conflict has detrimental effects on infants and children.
Existing literature in economics has documented the negative effects of violent
events on child health (Akresh et al., 2012b), child birthweight (Mansour and
Rees, 2012), height and cognitive skills (Duque, 2016), and long-run educational
achievements (Akresh, 2008). However, most studies seek to estimate the causal
effects of violent conflict either on the long-run educational outcomes or short-run
health outcomes like height and weight. Still, relatively little is known about how
short-run child time-allocation decisions, schooling outcomes, and contemporane-
ous health-seeking behaviors are distorted due to persistent violence.
In this chapter, we study the causal effects of violence on child time alloca-
tion, curative health care, and education. In particular, we examine how periods
of heightened conflict during the Nepalese Civil War (1996-2206) affect contem-
poraneous child labor and health care utilization decisions along with short-run
educational outcomes. As violence increases, parents are less likely to send their
children to school or take them to health facilities and more likely to keep them
home. Less time in school might translate to more time spent at work (paid or
unpaid) for these children. Coping with violence, therefore, disrupts education
and curative health care of young children which can be potentially damaging to
their later-life outcomes.
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Additionally, armed conflicts can have differential impacts on boys and girls.
Shemyakina (2011) finds that girls (but not boys) who were exposed to Tajik
armed conflict were less likely to complete mandatory schooling. Likewise,
Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) find that Guatemala’s 36-year-long civil war
affected the long-run education outcomes of Mayan females more adversely than
males. However, evidence on the gender disparity in the effects of armed conflict
is mixed. Akresh (2008) finds strong negative effects of the Rwandan genocide
on the completed education of boys. In terms of health outcomes, Akresh et al.
(2012b) find that both boys and girls who were born during the 1998–2000 Er-
itrea–Ethiopia experienced similar negative impacts on height-for-age Z-scores.
There is also evidence of how conflict affects children of certain age groups more
than the others, even though the research on this dimension remains limited. In
two separate studies, Shemyakina (2011) (for Tajik conflict) and Rodriguez and
Sanchez (2012) (for Colombian conflict) find that violent events affected schooling
outcomes of children aged 12 and older.
The salient horrors of violence are obvious and anecdotal evidence on them is
widely available. However, the causal effect of armed-conflict on contemporane-
ous outcomes of children is difficult to measure as data and information arrive
haphazardly. The reason being that violent events prevent survey takers from
doing their jobs. In this situation of an “informational black hole”, the Nepalese
Civil War (1996-2006) provides an excellent setting to examine the research ques-
tions. Firstly, this armed conflict did not deter ongoing surveys, hence, allowing
us to examine contemporaneous outcomes. Secondly, the nature of the war itself,
where different parts of the country experienced a varying level of violent events
overtime, provides us with the required geographical and temporal variation to
address our questions. The prolonged armed conflict between the Maoist and
the government of Nepal initially began in the Western part of the country as
2
a small-scale anti-government protests. However, over time the conflict engulfed
the entire country killing more than 13,000 people.
Our data on armed conflict comes from a unique database of victims from the
civil war which includes the date and the location of every war-related event.
We then merge this data with a nationally representative household survey to
access information on contemporaneous child-level outcomes during the conflict.
For identification, we exploit the spatial and temporal variation in exposure to
violence at local administrative levels.1 This gives us a setting for a quasi-natural
experiment to answer our research question.
We show that an increase in conflict-related violent events in the past 30 days
increases the total hours worked by children aged 5 to 16. A one standard devia-
tion increase in exposure to conflict in a given month increases total hours worked
by 4% of the sample mean. The estimated effects are especially substantial for
the time allocated to agricultural work: a one standard deviation in violence ex-
posure increases hours worked in agriculture by roughly 8% of the sample mean.
The impact of violence on time allocated to work is largely driven by the younger
cohort (age 5-11) and boys.
As for health-seeking behavior, we find that violence does not make people
sicker but reduces the probability of visiting a health care facility for children
less than 16 years of age. This effect is non-negligible: a one standard deviation
increase in violent events in the past 30 days, decreases the likelihood of taking a
child to a health facility by roughly 6% of the sample mean. Unlike the negative
impact of conflict on time-allocation, the drop in curative care-seeking behavior is
driven by girls. The potential connection between child’s (labor) productivity and
sound health can be a reason why we do not observe a decrease in curative care
for boys. Next, we focus on the educational outcomes of children during the war.
1Local administrative levels include Village Development (VDCs) and Municipalities which
are the second-lowest administrative units in Nepal.
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Exposure to violent events reduces the likelihood of currently attending school
and decreases years of education, in the short-run, by approximately 1.5 months.
The negative impact of violence on educational achievements is significant for
boys.
One of the potential mechanisms driving our contemporaneous outcomes is
that an increase in violent events changes parents’ perception of risk, hence, al-
tering their decisions related to children. This causal channel aligns with the
theoretical model provided by Estevan and Baland (2007). Their model shows
that when there is an increase in child mortality risk and parents are not very
altruistic, child labor increases whereas schooling decreases. An increase in mor-
tality risk hinders parents from truly internalizing the impact of child labor on
their children’s welfare. Therefore, they prefer immediate transfers from their
children in the form of child labor rather than risky investments like education.
The need for immediate transfer can also explain why violent events negatively
impact boys than girls. A larger portion of a child’s time allocation is on a phys-
ically strenuous and arduous task like agricultural work where the returns might
be higher from boys. On health-seeking behavior, our findings echo the results
from Molina (2016). She finds that local violence in the Philippines reduced cu-
rative care utilization for children by their parents due to avoidance behavior.
Violence increases the risk of being victimized which then translates to higher
non-monetary costs of seeking health care.
Related Literature and Contribution
This study is closely related to the literature in economics that studies the effect
of violence on child-level outcomes. Our findings relate well with those of Akresh
(2008) and Shemyakina (2011) who find negative effects of genocide and armed
conflict on educational achievements in Rwanda and Tajikistan, respectively. We
add to this literature by studying the contemporaneous effect of violence on child
4
time allocation and health-seeking behavior along with schooling outcomes. As
per our knowledge, Rodriguez and Sanchez (2012) and Di Maio and Nandi (2013)
are the only other two studies analyzing the effect of conflict on child-labor.
Valente (2013) studies the causal effect of conflict on education in Nepal but
relies on district-level analysis. During the time of conflict, Nepal had 75 districts
and 3,915 villages within those districts. We, on the other hand, exploit temporal
variation in conflict across these villages around the date of the survey and identify
the effects of local-level violence.
The second strand of literature this paper contributes to is the studies on
the relationship between violence and risk. Some experimental studies document
that exposure to violence can change one’s risk preferences (Brown et al., 2017;
Callen et al., 2014; Voors et al., 2012). Households also adjust their production,
savings and labor supply decisions as a response to income risk caused by an
increase in violence (Bundervoet et al., 2006; Fernández et al., 2011). We add
to this literature by providing suggestive evidence for risk associated with fear of
victimization and mortality in the context of Nepal’s civil war.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we elaborate on
the Nepalese Civil War. In Section 1.3 we discuss the main data sources that we
use in the chapter. Section 1.5 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 1.6 presents
results for the effect of violence on child time use, education, and health-seeking
behavior. Section 1.7 discusses potential channels and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Background
The Nepalese Civil War
On February 13, 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) formally
launched a rebellion against the government termed as the “People’s War”. This
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resulted in a prolonged armed conflict between the CPN-M forces and the gov-
ernment of Nepal that lasted until the Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed
in 2006. During this period over 13,000 people were killed and about 1,300 went
missing (UN, 2012).2
Historically, Nepal was governed as an absolute monarchy. During the early
1990s, Nepal transitioned to a constitutional monarchy, following a pro-democracy
movement – the Jana Andolan (“People’s Movement”) – that witnessed the uni-
fication of various political parties towards the establishment of a constitutional
framework. The “People’s Movement” led to the establishment of multiparty
democracy and voting rights, and in November 1990, the new constitution was
drafted. This raised expectations of social progress, and some historians believe
that this was one of the factors that contributed to the onset of internal conflict
in 1996.
Shortly before the formal announcement of the “People’s War”, the CPN-M
submitted a 40-point demand to the Nepali Government that covered many so-
cioeconomic and political issues, and warned of a militant struggle that would
follow if those demands were not met. Over the course of the next ten years,
acts of violence and destruction, human rights abuses, and mass killings by both,
government forces and the CPN-M forces, were committed across Nepal’s 75 dis-
tricts.3 Appendix 1.A shows the general time-line of key events during this civil
war.
The CPN-M militia served under the leadership of a Chairman, who was also
the Supreme Commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was
2Different sources provide different estimates for this figure. The government claims that
a total of 12,686 individuals were killed; although, since the State was actively involved in
killings during this period, the government has an incentive to under-report. While the National
Geographic Magazine also reports a similar figure as the government’s (Bendiksen and Douglas,
2005), we identify 13,247 killings from our microdata.
3With the exception of two districts – Manang and Mustang – all other districts witnessed
conflict-related killings. Manang and Mustangs districts are both high-altitude trans-Himalayan
regions and very sparsely populated.
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formed in September 2001. According to a UN (2012) report, the Maoist militia
had between 5,000 to 10,000 active combatants throughout the period of con-
flict and towards the end had expanded to multiple divisions across the country
that was organized under three commands that were under the authority of the
Supreme Commands and four Deputy Commanders. The PLA’s playbook in-
cluded guerrilla attacks, and sabotage and propaganda actions, such as random
destruction and seizure of property (Shrestha, 1997). The hilly terrains of Nepal
allowed the PLA to easily carry out guerrilla type warfare. Rural areas were more
likely to be affected, at least during the initial phases of the war.
Apart from the CPN-M militia, the government’s forces were also actively
involved during the conflict period to fight against the PLA. Initially, since the
conflict was seen as a minor threat, the Nepal Police (NP) was mobilized in
order to contain the insurgency. In 2001, the Armed Police Force of Nepal, a
paramilitary force, was set up in order to fight the insurgents due to the growing
power of the Maoist forces. The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) was not deployed
by the government until late 2001 citing that the insurgency was a law and order
problem that was to be addressed by the Nepal Police. Although the government’s
forces were to combat the insurgents, numerous acts of violence and unlawful
killings were committed as a result of collateral damage and chance encounters
(UN, 2012). In particular the targets included those who were alleged informants
or perceived as sympathizers for a particular side. Our microdata covers victims
of violence from both sides of the conflict.
1.3 Data
Our data primarily comes from three independent sources: (i) the Informal Sector
Service Center (INSEC) microdata on victims from conflict, (ii) the Nepal Living
Standards Survey, and (iii) the National Population Census.
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1.3.1 Microdata on Civil War
The data on victims from the Nepalese Civil War was collected by the Infor-
mal Sector Service Center (INSEC), a non-governmental organization based in
Nepal that works on human rights issues.4 This data was compiled from qual-
itative records from investigations of international human rights violations and
international humanitarian law violations during the ten-year insurgency and are
cross-referenced in the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Com-
missioner’s Nepal Conflict Archive.5 The data maintained by INSEC has been
used in previous studies, like those by Do and Iyer (2010)6 and Shrestha (2017),
and is, as per our knowledge, the most reliable and impartial database on conflict
intensity during the civil war. It is also unique in nature since it is a census of a
known population of victims from the war. The unit of observation is an individ-
ual victim. The data also provides information on whether the victim was killed,
injured, or disappeared along with information on the location and the exact date
of the violent event.
The INSEC data reports 14,959 fatalities, of which 13,247 were killings, 932
were disappearances, and 780 were instances when the victim sustained disabil-
ity inducing injuries.7 By construction the data excludes acts of violence where
people were not killed or injured, or did not disappear. For instance, if a build-
ing was torched and nobody was affected, our data would not record such an
incident. To this extent, our data includes only victimization from conflict and
not a broader set of threat to property and life due to conflict. Due to the rich
4This database is unique in that it is a census of victims from domestic conflict and is
compiled by an impartial entity–Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC). This is important
since both the Nepali government and the Maoist forces were actively involved in killings and
acts of violence throughout this period. It is only reasonable to suspect that if the government
were to build a similar database, it would necessarily try to underplay its role in the civil war.
5http://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org
6I use geographically granular data on conflict than this study.
7Authors’ calculation.
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temporal and spatial information in the data, we are able exploit variation along
these dimensions in order to identify the effect of risk due to violence on economic
decisions.
Figures 1.1 depicts the three major outcomes of violent events (killed, dis-
appeared, or injured). More than half the number of deaths were caused by the
government’s forces. Figure 1.2(a) summarizes the distribution of deaths through-
out the conflict by the perpetrator (State, Maoist, and Others). This data also
captures the delayed involvement of the Nepali government’s forces in the civil
war. Specifically, after 2001, once the army was deployed, the number of deaths
due to the State were strikingly higher than those caused by the Maoists. Fig-
ure 1.2(b) depicts the causes of these deaths as recorded in the INSEC database.
Out of all the deaths that occurred during this war, 30% were due to combat
fighting whereas the remaining of the victims died in a non-combat setting. The
majority of the deaths in the non-combat setting was due to extra-judicial killing
perpetrated by the state.
Spatial and Temporal Variation in Conflict
Figure 1.3 shows district-level spatial and temporal variation in conflict-related
events from the start of this war to its end. Violent events first started in districts
like Rukum and Rolpa and slowly started spreading in neighboring districts with
varying and greater intensity (as it goes from lighter to darker shades). Here, for
each individual map, we define intensity as conflict-related events (deaths, killing
or disappearances) per 1000 population within a district for the given time frame.
Although this district-level breakdown of conflict intensity provides information
on the geographical spread of conflict across time, our analysis actually uses Vil-
lage Development Committees (VDCs) and municipality level analysis. VDCs
and municipalities are the second-lowest administrative units and collections of
these VDCs and few municipalities make up a district. Focusing on smaller ad-
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ministrative units allows conflict to be local enough to influence decision making.
Figure 1.B.1 in Appendix 1.B shows all the villages marked in red for which some
kind of conflict-related event has been recorded in the INSEC data. Out of 3915
Village Development Committees (VDCs) and municipalities8, the conflict data
records some violent events for 2427 of them. This spatial and temporal variation
in conflict across local level administrative units is what we intend to exploit in
this paper.
In order to illustrate the variation in conflict intensity across time and space,
we plot the standard deviation of the number of violent events per thousand
population across time and space (district level). Figure 1.4 plots the cross-
sectional standard deviation for all districts across time (1996-2006) and Figure
1.5 plots the standard deviation for each district across time. As can be seen in
Figure 1.4, with reference to the time-line of events in Appendix 1.A, the period
immediately after the army was employed in November 2001 until the second
round of peace talks began in January 2003, witnessed an increased number of
killings across the country. There were however regions that witnessed relatively
low levels of violence even during the peak of the war. Taken together, these two
figures show the variation that we exploit in order to identify he causal effects of
violence on household decisions on issues related to children.9
1.3.2 Nepal Living Standards Survey
To study the impact of violence on the household’s economic decisions such as
education, labor and time allocation, and health care of children, we use data from
the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), otherwise known as the Nepal
Living Standards Survey (NLSS). This is a multi-topic representative household
8VDCs (rural) and municipalities (urban)are the second-lowest administrative units in Nepal.
Collection of VDCs and municipalities make up a district
9While doing so we are obviously restricted by the time-line of other surveys and the nature
of questions in those surveys.
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survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and is available for
the periods of 1995-96, 2003-04, and 2010-11. The survey is a cross-section that
covers a broad range of household-level topics including consumption, income,
labor markets, education, and health. Our outcome variables and bulk of control
variables are taken from the NLSS, 2003-04 as the time of the survey falls within
the conflict period allowing us to assess contemporaneous decision making during
the time of armed conflict.
1.3.3 Population Census of Nepal
To weight our victim-level data by village-level population, we use the National
Population Census of 2001. In order to distinguish between densely populated
villages with a lot of violent events and sparsely populated regions with few deaths,
our weighting technique is crucial in understanding the differential effect of conflict
intensity across time and space.
1.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics on our variables of interest and controls.
Panel A of the table provides the descriptive statistics for children’s time spent
in work each week. On average, children of ages between 5 to 16 worked for 10.8
hours per week. This involves working in wage/non-wage market activities within
or outside the household, agricultural work, or domestic chores. The variation in
total hours worked is also high at 17.6 hours per week. A larger amount of time
is allocated to agricultural work where children spent an average of 6.3 hours per
week. The NLSS also provides information on how many hours these children
worked in a year. The mean hours worked in activities outside schooling per year
is equal to 426.3 hours.
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Though the decision to obtain an education is a dynamic process, the NLSS
has information on only final education outcomes observed at the time of the
survey. Unlike time allocation in other activities, this survey does not report the
number of hours dedicated to schooling per week. For education, we focus on ages
6 and above as Nepal’s Education Act of 1971 10 suggested the minimum age for
primary school enrollment to be 6 years. Panel B of Table 1.1 reports the mean
and standard deviation of educational outcomes of children aged 6 to 16 during
the time of the survey. 80 percent of children reported having been ever enrolled
and currently attending school. A large number of children are not in appropriate
grade for their age. On average, 70 percent of current school-going children are
over-age for the grades they are attending. Finally, the mean number of years of
education for this age group is at 5.2 years.
Panel C of 1.1 reports summary statistics on health-seeking behavior for chil-
dren of ages between 0 to 16. Only 8 percent of the children were taken to health
services in the past 30 days to seek any curative health care. Fifty percent of
children are female and eighty percent of them are from rural locations. The
average number of years of education of household head is 3.9 years whereas that
of the mother is of 1.8 years only.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 Specification
Since we are interested in contemporaneous and short-run outcomes, we exploit
conflict around the date of the NLSS survey for each individual. We estimate the
following specification: for outcome yivt of child i, living in village/municipality
10The first amendment of this Act was in July 2003. However, NLSS survey had already
begun by then and the school year had already started for the amendment to have an immediate
impact.
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v and surveyed at date t11, we have
yivt =  0 +  1Intensityivt +X
0
iv +  m +  y + ↵ps + "ivt (1.1)
where Intensityivt is a measure of conflict intensity that child i was exposed to
in village v up to the date of the survey t. The construction of conflict intensity
is outcome variable specific. For contemporaneous outcomes like time allocation
and curative health care seeking, our goal is to understand if local-level conflict
around the time of the survey has any causal impact. In this case, Intensityivt is
calculated as the total number of conflict-related events in the past 30 days up to
the date of the survey per 1000 population in a village or a municipality. As men-
tioned earlier, unlike time allocation outcomes, the NLSS provides information
only on the final educational outcomes of the children reported at the time of the
survey. Therefore, for impacts on short-run educational outcomes, Intensityivt is
measured as the sum of the total number of violent events per 1000 population a
child was exposed to since her birth (if born after 1996) or after the start of the
civil war in 1996 (for those born before 1996) up to the date of the survey.
The NLSS survey spans over a period of more than one year. However, there
is a limited variation in the date of survey of households within the same village
or municipality and inclusion of local level fixed effects will drive away all the
variation that we intend to exploit. Therefore, we include district-specific stra-
tum fixed effects denoted by ↵ps. District is a larger administrative area which
includes several villages and municipalities. At the time of the survey, Nepal had
75 districts and 3,915 villages or municipalities within those districts. Stratum
here takes care of the ecological and topographical division of villages and mu-
nicipalities. Xiv are a set of individual, household and village level controls such
as the age of the child, gender, mother’s education, household head’s education,
11Date includes day d, of month m of year y
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household size, household wealth, village-level population, and total time taken
to primary school or nearest health facility. We also control for ethnicity fixed
effects.  m and  y are month and year of survey fixed effects. The coefficient
of interest,  1, measures the effect of a unit increase in conflict exposure on the
outcome variable of interest. ✏ivt is the error term of the regression model. Fi-
nally, we estimate all regressions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and cluster
standard errors at the village or municipality level.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Child Time Allocation and Labor
When the number of violent events in a locality increases, parents might decide to
keep their children home and involve them in household work or other activities
like agriculture. Spending more time in economic work or domestic chores by
children due to ongoing conflict translates to a reduction in time allocated to
studying or leisure.
Our source for the time use data is the NLSS-2003 survey which records hours
per week or per year dedicated by children (aged 5-16) to various activities outside
schooling. This allows us to analyze if local-level conflict in the past 30 days
or 12 months from the date of the survey (for the latter measure of time use)
had any contemporaneous effect on a child’s time allocation and labor supply.
Our measure of conflict intensity (Intensityivt) variable as shown in equation 1.1
is calculated as the total number of conflict-related events in the past 30 days
(or 12 months) up to the date of survey per 1000 population in a village or a
municipality. The first two rows of Table 1.2 present summary statistics for our
measure of conflict intensity used to analyze impacts on time allocation. The mean
of conflict intensity in the past 30 days and is 0.02 with a standard deviation of
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0.1 whereas the average conflict intensity in the past 12 months is 0.2 with a
standard deviation of 0.6.
Table 1.3 reports the coefficient estimates from equation 1.1 for time use of
children in past 7 days. Column 1 of Panel A shows the results for the entire
sample of children aged 5-16. We find that a one standard deviation increase
in conflict intensity in the past 30 days, which is 0.1 (Table 1.2), increases total
hours worked in a week by 4.205 ⇥ 0.1 = 0.4205 hours which is roughly 4% of
the sample mean. This effect is significant and largely driven by an increase of
approximately 7.4% of the sample mean in the total hours worked by younger
children aged 5 to 11 (Column 2 of Panel A). Panels B and C of Columns 1 and
2 present results for effects on total hours worked for female and male samples,
respectively. The increase in total hours for all children aged 5 to 16 is driven by
an increase in working hours of boys belonging to both younger (age 5 to 11) and
older (age 12 to 16) age-cohorts. For girls, there is a significant increase in total
hours worked only for the younger cohort.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 1.3 present the results for the contemporaneous effect
of exposure to violence on time allocated to agricultural work. A standard de-
viation increase in conflict intensity in the past month increases time dedicated
to agriculture for children of ages 5 to 16 by 5.340 ⇤ 0.1 = 0.534 hours which is
roughly 8.4% of the sample mean. The magnitude of the effect on time dedicated
to agriculture is larger for the younger cohort (approximately 15% of the sample
mean). As seen in Columns 4-6 of Panel C, these results are driven by an in-
crease in the time allocated by boys belonging to both younger and older cohorts.
Whereas for girls (Columns 4-6 of Panel B) a significant increase in agricultural
work due to recent violence is observed only for the younger cohort of ages 5 to
11. The coefficients hours spent in domestic activities are negative but very small
in magnitude with no statistical significance. 12
12Table 1.C.1 reports estimates for 1.1 when the outcome variable is hours worked in past
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1.6.2 Health
Curative Health Seeking Behavior
Our next goal is to understand if conflict-related events in the past 30 days
affect parents’ decision to seek any health care for their children less than 16 years
of age. We focus on health-seeking behavior because a lack of proper health care,
especially in developing countries, can be detrimental to children, the effect of
which can last into adulthood. Access to proper health care can also improve
school attendance and performance. Additionally, a larger portion of a child’s
time allocation is on arduous agricultural work, collecting water or firewood. In
this case, parents might have a greater incentive to seeking curative health care
of children to improve their productivity in physically strenuous activities.
Table 1.4 presents estimates for equation 1.1 where the outcome variable is
a dummy that takes value 1 if the survey respondent reported that any health
care was sought for the child in past 30 days. As seen in Column 1 of Panel
A, conflict intensity is negatively associated with health care. A one standard
deviation increase in conflict in the past 30 days, decreases the likelihood of taking
a child of age between 0-16 to a health facility by  0.052 ⇥ 0.1 = 0.0052 points
which is 6.11 % of the sample mean. This drop is significant and negative for
children of age cohort 5 to 16 by  0.034 ⇥ 0.1 = 0.0034 points which is roughly
6.3% of the sample mean. The drop in the probability of seeking curative care
is driven by the negative impact of recent conflict on health-seeking for female
children as observed in Panel B. A standard deviation increase in conflict intensity
12 months. For this estimation, our measure of conflict intensity (Intensityivt) is the total
number of violent events per thousand population in a village or a municipality in the past 12
months of the date of the survey. An increase in conflict intensity does not have a significant
impact on total hours worked. The only exception is the older male cohort for which the effect is
significant and positive. However, we do find a significant effect on hours worked in agricultural
work. A one standard deviation increase in conflict in the past 12 months, which is 0.6 (Table
1.2) increases yearly time allocated to agricultural work by 56.329 ⇥ 0.6 = 33.8 hours which is
roughly 14.4% of the mean. This impact is significant (in comparison to the sample mean) for
both boys and girls belonging to the younger cohort.
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reduces the probability of going to a health facility for girls  0.080⇥0.1 = 0.0080
points which is roughly 16% of the sample mean. Girls of age group 5 to 11 are
also significantly impacted by recent violence. We do not find evidence for any
significant effect of conflict on curative health care seeking of boys.
The NLSS survey records the answer to whether a child was taken to a health
facility if only she was reported to be ill in the past 30 days. Following Molina
(2016), we assigned a zero to those children who were not reported to be sick
while creating the outcome variable in Table 1.4. This is consistent with this
variable being an indicator of curative care-seeking and not health-care utilization
after being sick. To check if conflict affects sick children differently, we run the
estimation only for sick children. The results of this estimation are presented
in Table 1.5. Before we describe the results in detail, we limit this analysis to
sick children belonging to ages 16 or below. Conducting sub-sample analysis of
different age cohorts reduces our sample size by a lot resulting in issues with the
power of the test.
As seen in Column 1 of Table 1.5, an increase in conflict in the past 30 days
negatively impacts curative health care seeking but we fail to find any statistical
significance. However, when we analyze female and male samples separately, we
find a negative association of conflict with curative health care seeking for sick
girls. A standard deviation increase in conflict intensity decreases the probability
of being taken to health facility for sick girls by  0.863 ⇥ 0.1 = 0.0863 or 8.63
percentage points. This decrease in the probability is roughly 13.4% of the sample
mean. The result for sick boys is, however, the complete opposite. As conflict
increases by one standard deviation, curative health care seeking for male children
increases by 0.0493 or 4.93 percentage points, which is 7% of the sample mean.
Parents prefer to take sick boys to health facilities during times of conflict because
these periods are also marked by an increase in their labor supply. The potential
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connection between a child’s productivity and sound health might be a motivating
factor for this increase in the likelihood of health care utilization for sick male
children.
Does conflict make children sick?
However, the effect of conflict can be two-fold: 1) as discussed above, it can
prevent parents’ from seeking health-care for their children, which in turn might
deteriorate their health, 2) conflict can itself make children sicker. Therefore,
to understand the effect of violence on health-seeking behavior, it is crucial to
know if conflict itself is making children sicker. NLSS survey asks respondents
questions on the exact date of when they last fell sick and for each village, we have
information on the number of conflict-related events for each day from 1996-2006.
Using this information we create an artificial unbalanced village-level panel. To
do this, for each reported date of sickness, we sum up all respondents of the same
village who fell sick on that particular day. We then estimate the following panel
regression:
Sjt =  1 +  2Intensityjt +  j + ↵t + ✏jt (1.2)
,where Sjt is the number of children (age 0-16) in a village j who reported
being sick on date t. Intensityjt is is a measure of conflict intensity calculated by
adding the total number of conflict-related events in the past 30 days up to the
date of reported illness weighted by the population of the village times 1000. We
also include village and date of illness fixed effects,  j and ↵t, respectively and
cluster the standard errors are at the village level.
Table 1.6 shows the results for the panel estimation as seen in equation 1.2.
Conflict intensity in the past 30 days of the date of reported illness has no sig-
nificant effect on the number of children reported being sick. The statistical
insignificance of the coefficient estimates remains when we run the specification
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for boys and girls separately. Therefore, conflict does not make children sick,
rather the channel it operates by is affecting healthcare-seeking behavior.
1.6.3 Education
An increase in hours worked on other activities immediately after a period of
violent conflict raises the question of whether this leads to a decrease in the time
allocated to schooling. Unfortunately, the NLSS does not have any information
on hours spent in schooling but only on final educational outcomes observed at
the time of the survey. As a result of which, we summed up the total number of
violent events a child was exposed to since her birth (if born after 1996) or after
the start of the civil war in 1996 (for those born before 1996) up to the date of the
survey to calculate the number of violent events per thousand population (conflict
intensity, Intensityivdmy). The summary statistics for this measure of conflict
intensity can be found in the third row of Table 1.2. On average, children were
exposed to 0.6 violent events per thousand population with a standard deviation
of 2.3. The maximum exposure is at 41.8 events per 1000 population.
As mentioned earlier, the minimum age for primary schooling in 2003 was 6
years old. Therefore, the only cohort born after the civil war that we can include
in our analysis is those who were born in the year 1997. Since, children aged 7-16
at the time of the survey were born in 1996 or before, there is very little variation
in conflict intensity across birth year cohorts within the same village. Therefore,
we follow our baseline specification of equation 1.1 to include only year and month
of the survey, and stratum varying district fixed effects.
Enrollment
Violent events due to armed conflict would have affected parents’ decisions to
enroll their children in primary schools. The age group whose enrollment was
affected by the war includes children who were of 6 years or below in 1996 (13
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years and below in 2003) or those who were born after 1996. We do not observe
these children after 2003 and hence do not know their long term school enrollment
outcome. However, we can assess whether exposure to conflict impacted their
likelihood of ever being enrolled in primary school. This effect on enrollment
can be considered as the short-run effects of conflict. Because the official age to
start primary school was 6 years in Nepal, we study the effect of conflict in the
probability of ever being enrolled during the wartime of students aged 6 to 13 in
2003. Column 1 of Table 3.1 presents results for this estimation. The outcome
variable takes value 1 if a child was ever enrolled in school. Though the sign of
the coefficient on Panel A of Column 1 is negative, it is very small in magnitude
and we fail to find any significant effect on enrollment.
Currently Attending
The enrollment variable above does not tell us whether the child was out of
school at the time of the survey or had to drop out. A child might have been
enrolled in school at some point in time but might not be currently attending
due to a violent situation. Columns 2-5 of Table 3.1 present estimates for an
outcome variable “Currently Attending" which takes value 1 if a child is reported
to be attending school at the time of the survey. Panel A of column 1 shows that
exposure to the conflict has a negative and significant effect on the probability
of currently attending school for children who are of ages 6 to 16. However,
the magnitude of this effect on education is smaller compared to the effects on
labor hours. A one standard deviation increase in conflict intensity, which is 2.3
(Table 1.2), leads to a decrease in the likelihood of currently attending school by
0.005⇥2.3 = 0.0115 or 1.15 percentage points - approximately 1.45 percent of the
sample mean. For a highly exposed child (conflict intensity of 41.8), this drop is
nearly 27% of the sample mean. This result is largely driven by the older cohort
of ages 12 to 16, as seen in Column 4 of Panel A.
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Columns 2-4 of Panel C present results for this estimation for boys. As observed
in Column 2, the drop in the likelihood of currently attending school due to
being exposed to conflict is negative and highly significant for boys. A standard
deviation increase in conflict decreases this probability by 0.006⇥2.3 = 0.0138 or
1.38 percentage points, which is nearly 1.67% of the sample mean. We observe a
significant drop in the likelihood of attending school for both younger (age 6 to
11) and older (age 12 to 16) boys. This result is in line with the effect of conflict
on child time allocation and labor hours worked (Section 1.6.1) where results were
largely driven by an increase in hours worked by male children.
Over-age
Conflict increases the likelihood of delay enrollment in primary school, absen-
teeism in school, missed exams, and closure of schools leading to grade repetition.
Even though we do not have direct measures for these variables, we can study
whether conflict affects the probability of students being in the appropriate grade
for their age. We limit our sample to students who are of 6-16 years of age in 2003
and currently attending school. Columns 5 to 7 of Table 3.1 report the results for
equation 1.1 where the outcome is an indicator for a child currently being below
the grade she is supposed to be for her age - that is, if her age is greater than
the nationally determined age for that grade. As seen in Panel B, for the entire
sample of children, an increase in conflict intensity increases the probability of
being overage for older (age 12 to 16) children.
However, as seen in, Columns 5-7 of Panel C, when we run the specification for
boys the results are positive in sign and highly significant. A standard deviation
increase in conflict intensity increases the likelihood of being over-age for boys
(Column 5) by 0.007 ⇥ 2.3 = 0.0161 or 1.61 percentage points, which is nearly
2.25% of the sample mean. Though we observe this increase for both younger
and older cohorts, the magnitude of the effect is larger for the former group. For
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younger boys (Column 6), a standard deviation increase in conflict increases the
probability of being over-age by 0.010 ⇥ 2.3 = 0.023 which is roughly 4% of the
sample mean for this cohort.
Surprisingly, for girls of ages 6 to 16 (Column 5 of Panel B), an increase in
conflict intensity reduces their probability of being over-age and this effect is
driven by the younger girls.
Years of education
Next, we study whether conflict affected the number of years of education of
children. We study children below the age of 16 at the time of the survey and
hence, can only analyze the short-run effects of conflict on educational achieve-
ment. Table 1.8 reports estimates for years of education. As observed in Panel
A, a one standard deviation increase in conflict intensity decreases years of ed-
ucation of exposed children by 0.031 ⇥ 2.3 = 0.0713 years or approximately by
a month. This estimate is only 0.6% of the sample mean. This result is largely
driven by the drop in the years of education of boys, as observed in Panel C.
A standard deviation increase in conflict intensity reduces years of education of
boys by 0.055⇥ 2.3 = 0.1265, i.e., roughly by almost 1.5 months.
1.6.4 Potential Threat to Identification
Exogeneity of Violent Events
Numerous studies put conflict on the left-hand side of an equation that consists
of demographic characteristics, resources, geographic and political conditions on
the right-hand side in an attempt to provide explanations for when and why
conflict arises in a particular setting, between two or more groups. This literature
has explored and found various determinants of conflict such as, the presence
of natural resources and ‘lootable wealth’ (Weinstein, 2006; Ross, 2004, 2006;
Adhvaryu et al., 2018), international aid (De Ree and Nillesen, 2009; Nunn and
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Qian, 2014; Crost et al., 2014), arbitrary national boundaries (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2013), inequality and ethnic cleavages (Cederman et al., 2013,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005, Esteban et al., 2012), the opportunity cost
of conflict (Miguel et al., 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2013), the lack of political
accountability and democracy (Skrede Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010) and other
types of exploitative institutions (Richards, 1996; Wood, 2003). While conflict,
in and of itself, may never be fully exogenous, we test for valid concerns that may
prove as a threat to our identification strategy.
As a first pass, we run the following specification to test for consistent month,
year, district effects:
Intensityjt =  0 +  1 (montht) +  2 (year) +  1 (districtj) + "jt (1.3)
where we test for the presence of consistent month, year, and district-specific
effects. We then plot the residuals from this regression along with the number of
victims due to conflict across time in Figure 1.6 and we see that these residuals
almost perfectly align with the number of victims from conflict. This shows that
unobservable time and district level characteristics are not affecting our results.
1.7 Mechanism
One of the potential mechanisms driving our contemporaneous outcomes is that
an increase in violent events changes parents’ perception of risk, hence, altering
their decisions related to children. This causal channel aligns with the theoreti-
cal model provided by Estevan and Baland (2007). Their model shows that when
there is an increase in child mortality risk and parents are not very altruistic, child
labor increases whereas schooling decreases. An increase in mortality risk hinders
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parents from truly internalizing the impact of child labor on their children’s wel-
fare. Therefore, they prefer immediate transfers from their children in the form of
child labor rather than risky investments like education. The need for immediate
transfer can also explain why violent events negatively impact boys than girls.
Larger portion of a child’s time allocation is on a physically strenuous and ardu-
ous task like agricultural work where the returns might be higher from boys. On
health-seeking behavior, our findings echo the results from Molina (2016). She
finds that local violence in the Philippines reduced curative care utilization for
children by their parents due to avoidance behavior. Violence increases the risk
of being victimized which then translates to higher non-monetary costs of seeking
health care.
Valente (2013) reports finding positive effects of Nepal’s civil war on the edu-
cation of girls with no significant impact on the educational achievements of boys.
She argues that the positive effect on female educational attainment might be due
to change in societal attitude toward female schooling and the Maoist policy13 of
coercing parents to send their daughters to school. Though our results do not find
a significant impact of conflict on the educational achievements of girls, we do find
that girls are more likely to be in the grade appropriate to their age. Maoist’s
motto of a more equitable society might be one of the potential channels driving
our results on education.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper intends to document the effects of violent events on short-run economic
decisions and outcomes. We focus on aspects of human capital accumulation,
such as education, and health, and child’s time use. Using microdata from a
unique database of violent events we find that during the periods of heightened
13Although there are several anecdotal evidence of Maoist’s policy disrupting schooling.
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violence, parents are more likely to involve their children, especially boys, in
work-related activities. Conflict-related events also hamper education of boys.
However, increase in violence reduces curative-care seeking for girls rather than
boys. The potential connection between a boy’s productivity at arduous tasks
like agricultural work and sound health might be a motivating factor in play here.
So far we have not been able to perfectly disentangle whether the forces of
demand or supply are at work, but this is something we are interested in doing
for future work. One could think of violence as an imposition of a tax to everyday
economic activity and this tax could distort both the supply and demand side.
Alternatively, in the long run, one could think of violence affecting preferences
as well. To disentangle whether violence affects prices or preferences, we may
need a structural model that poses some testable implications of the effects of an
increase in risk.
Finally, whether these short-run effects have long-run consequences is a valid
question. This is the second, and more interesting, question that we wish to
answer in future work. Are individuals who have invested less in education due
to the risk of violence worse off, and if so, do they have worse labor market
outcomes in the future? Are children who have not been provided proper curative
care in the early stages of life worse off on their later life outcomes? My second
chapter partially answers these questions by analyzing the long-run implications
of exposure to conflict in childhood.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Outcome of incident by perpetrator
Notes: In the figure above, we plot the outcomes (killed, disappeared, and injured) of violent
events by perpetrator of respective incidence.
(a) Number of Deaths
by Perpetrator
(b) Cause of Death
Figure 1.2: Number of Victims: by perpetrator and by cause of death
Notes: Figure (a) plots the total number of deaths each year by perpetrator. Figure (b) plots
the cause of death by perpetrator. In this figure, serious nature deaths were caused by heinous
killings that involved prolonged torture of the victim by the perpetrator.
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Figure 1.3: Conflict Intensity: 1996–2006
(a) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by (b) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by
districts in 1996 districts from 1996-98
(c) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by (d) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by
districts from 1996-00 districts from 1996-02
(e) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by (f) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by
districts from 1996-04 districts from 1996-06
Notes: The maps above show the spread of Nepalese Civil War (in terms of conflict intensity) from 1996-2006.
Conflict intensity is measured as the number of cumulated conflict related victims from 1996 to year on the figure per
thousand population within a district. Although this district level breakdown of conflict intensity provides information
on geographical spread of conflict across time, my analysis actually uses VDCs and municipalities (second lowest
administrative unit) level analysis. 27
Figure 1.4: Spatial Variation in Conflict Intensity (across time)
Notes: In the graph above, for each time period, we provide the standard deviation in conflict
exposure across districts. Conflict exposure (intensity) is measured as casualties/1000
population.
Figure 1.5: Temporal Variation in Conflict Intensity (across districts)
Notes: In the box plot above, we provide the standard deviation in conflict exposure across
different time period. Conflict exposure (intensity) is measured as casualties/1000 population.
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Figure 1.6: Test for Exogeneity of Conflict
Notes: In the figure above, we plot the residuals of the regression of conflict intensity on
month, year, and district fixed effects.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD N
Panel A: Time Allocation Outcomes (Age 5-16)
Total hrs worked in past 7 days in:
all activities 10.8 17.6 7791
agriculture 6.3 13.2 7791
domestic work 3.6 8.5 7791
Total hrs worked in past 12 months in:
all activities 426.3 724.0 7791
agriculture 234.7 500.1 7791
domestic work 159.4 379.9 7791
Panel B: Education Outcomes (Age 6-16)
(Ever enrolled) 0.8 0.4 7106
(Currently attending school) 0.8 0.4 7104
(Over-age for the grade) 0.7 0.5 5479
Education (years) 5.2 3.4 7106
Time taken to primary school (minutes) 17.0 23.7 7106
Panel C: Health Care Outcomes (Age 0-16)
(Any curative care) 0.08 0.3 10914
Time taken to health facility (minutes) 46.9 67.8 10914
Panel D: Other Variables (Age 5-16)
Female 0.5 0.5 7791
Child’s age 10.4 3.4 7791
Rural location 0.8 0.4 7791
HH head’s education (years) 3.9 5.0 7791
Mother’s education (years) 1.8 3.8 7790
Household’s size 7.0 3.1 7791
Wealth 12.8 1.3 7791
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for NLSS (2003) data. Panel A reports the summary
statistics for time allocation outcomes. Total hours is a continuous variable and it is the total sum of time spent in
different activities outside schooling in the past 7 days. Panel B reports the summary statistics for educational outcomes.
Ever enrolled is an indicator for whether the child has been ever enrolled in school upto the time of the survey. Panel C
report the summary statistics for health-seeking behavior where Any curative care is an indicator for if the child was taken
to a health service facility in the past 30 days. Wealth in Panel D is the log of total assets owned by the household.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics - Conflict
Mean SD Min Max
Total no. of deaths/1000 population:
in past 30 days 0.02 0.10 0 1.3
in past 12 months 0.2 0.6 0 7.9
from birth to survey date 0.6 2.3 0 41.8
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for conflict intensity. Conflict exposure denotes no. casual-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Effect of exposure to conflict on curative health care seeking
Any curative health care
0 to 16 0 to 4 5 to 16 5 to 11 12 to 16
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel A: All Sample
Conflict -0.052⇤⇤ -0.085 -0.034⇤⇤ -0.047⇤⇤ -0.014
(0.022) (0.063) (0.013) (0.021) (0.031)
Obs. 10912 3120 7792 4607 3185
Mean Outcome. 0.085 0.161 0.054 0.061 0.045
Panel B: Female Only
Conflict -0.082⇤ -0.106 -0.080⇤⇤ -0.072⇤⇤ -0.103
(0.042) (0.104) (0.034) (0.036) (0.067)
Obs. 5377 1554 3823 2271 1552
Mean Outcome. 0.076 0.140 0.049 0.055 0.042
Panel C: Male Only
Conflict -0.023 -0.090 0.018 -0.014 0.048
(0.032) (0.077) (0.037) (0.062) (0.035)
Obs. 5535 1566 3969 2336 1633
Mean Outcome. 0.094 0.182 0.059 0.067 0.048
Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity & District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( 1) from specification 1.1. Conflict denotes casualties/1000
population in a village or a municipality in the past 30 days. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality
of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls include:
child’s gender, and age, rural or urban region, education of the household health and mother, household size, wealth,
time taken to health service center and village level population. The outcome of interest is an indicator that takes
value 1 if any curative care was sought for the child. Panel A presents results for entire sample. Panel B & C show
results for female and male sub-sample, respectively. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at
10% level of significance.
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Table 1.5: Effect of exposure to conflict on health care
utilization
Any curative health care (Sick only),
Age 0-16
All Sample Female Male
[1] [2] [3]
Conflict -0.008 -0.863⇤⇤ 0.493⇤⇤⇤
(0.181) (0.396) (0.177)
Obs. 1372 632 740
Mean Outcome. 0.676 0.644 0.703
Disease, Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity &
District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( 1) from specification
1.1. Conflict denotes casualties/1000 population in a village or a municipality in
the past 30 days. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth.
Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated
using OLS. Controls include: child’s gender, and age, rural or urban region, ed-
ucation of the household health and mother, household size, wealth, time taken
to health service center and village level population. The outcome of interest is
an indicator that takes value 1 if any curative care was sought for the child. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
Table 1.6: Effect of exposure to conflict on number of
children reported sick
Number of sick children aged 0-16
All Sample Female Male
[1] [2] [3]
Conflict 0.024 0.014 0.029
(0.022) (0.026) (0.032)
Obs. 4740 2422 2536
Mean Outcome. 1.101 1.052 1.053
Date and Location Fixed Effects
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( 1) from specification
1.2. Conflict denotes casualties/1000 population in a village or a municipality in
the past 30 days of reported date of sickness. Standard errors are clustered by
VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression.
The results are estimated using OLS. The outcome of interest is total number
of sick children reported in a particular date in a village or municipality. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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Table 1.7: Effect of exposure to conflict on educational status
Ever
Enrolled Currently Attending Over Age
6 to 13 6 to 16 6 to 11 12 to 16 6 to 16 6 to 11 12 to 16
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Panel A: All Sample
Conflict -0.001 -0.005⇤⇤ -0.003 -0.007⇤⇤⇤ -0.000 -0.001 0.003⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 5264 7103 3929 3174 5478 3205 2273
Mean Outcome. 0.841 0.776 0.818 0.725 0.707 0.607 0.846
Panel B: Female Only
Conflict 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.023 -0.011⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤ 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017)
Obs. 2549 3467 1920 1547 2434 1458 976
Mean Outcome. 0.785 0.708 0.763 0.641 0.697 0.599 0.842
Panel C: Male Only
Conflict -0.002 -0.006⇤⇤⇤ -0.004⇤ -0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Obs. 2715 3636 2009 1627 3044 1747 1297
Mean Outcome. 0.893 0.841 0.871 0.805 0.715 0.614 0.850
Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity & District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( 1) from specification 1.1. Conflict denotes total number of deaths
per 1000 population in the village or municipality of residence that the child is ever exposed to until the date of survey.
Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The
results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: child’s gender, and age, rural or urban region, education of the household
health and mother, household size, wealth, time taken to primary school and village level population. Currently attending is
an indicator of whether the child is attending school during the time of the survey. Over age take value 1 if the child’s age is
greater than the recommended age for the class s/he is currently attending. Panel A presents results for entire sample. Panel
B & C show results for female and male sub-sample, respectively. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant
at 10% level of significance.
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Table 1.8: Effect of exposure to conflict on years of education
Years of Education
6 to 16 6 to 11 12 to 16
[1] [2] [3]
Panel A: All Sample
Conflict -0.031⇤⇤⇤ -0.013 -0.064⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.009) (0.022)
Obs. 7104 3930 3174
Mean Outcome. 5.198 3.787 6.946
Panel B: Female Only
Conflict -0.004 0.019 -0.149
(0.018) (0.015) (0.139)
Obs. 3468 1921 1547
Mean Outcome. 4.739 3.506 6.271
Panel C: Male Only
Conflict -0.055⇤⇤⇤ -0.047⇤⇤⇤ -0.073⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.010) (0.025)
Obs. 3636 2009 1627
Mean Outcome. 5.635 4.055 7.586
Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity & District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( 1) from specification 1.1. Conflict denotes
total number of deaths per 1000 population in the village or municipality of residence that the child
is ever exposed to until the date of survey. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality
of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS.
Controls include: child’s gender, and age, rural or urban region, education of the household health
and mother, household size, wealth, time taken to primary school and village level population. The
outcome of interest is total years of education. Panel A presents results for entire sample. Panel B &
C show results for female and male sub-sample, respectively. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at
5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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APPENDIX
1.A Timeline of Nepalese Civil War
1959 • New constitution establishes parliamentary democracy (a “partyless”
Panchayat system)
1990 • “People’s Movement” (Jana Andolan) ended 28 years of monarchical
rule; established panchayat system of self-government
February, 1996 • Formal announcement of the “Peoples War” by the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist)
June, 2001 • Ten royal family members are massacred in their palace, allegedly by
Prince Dipendra
Aug–Nov, 2001 • First round of peace talks begin (3 rounds held until November, 2001)
23rd November, 2001 • Peace talks collapse
26th November, 2001 • State of Emergency is declared and Nepal Army is sent in to attack the
Maoists
January, 2003 • A second ceasefire is established and a second set of peace talks begin
Apr–Aug, 2003 • Three rounds of peace talks held
August, 2003 • Maoists withdraw from the ceasefire
September, 2005 • Maoists declare a three-month unilateral ceasefire to woo opposition
political parties
January, 2006 • Maoists decide not to extend the four-month ceasefire stating that the
government had broken the ceasefire with numerous attacks on Maoist
villages
May, 2006 • Nepal’s new cabinet declares a ceasefire. The cabinet also announces
that the Maoist rebels will no longer be considered a terrorist group.
Rebels are also encouraged to open peace talks.
November, 2006 • Peace talks end with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord
between Prime Minister Koirala and Maoist leader Prachanda. The
deal allows the Maoists to take part in government, and places their
weapons under UN monitoring.
Notes: As can be seen from the table above, the Maoists repeatedly withdrew ceasefire following
multiple rounds of peace talks and these were events that were typically followed by mass strikes




Figure 1.B.1: Village Development Committees (VDCs) & Municipalities of
Nepal (in red) that experienced some conflict-related events from 1996-2006.
Notes: Out of 3,915 Village Development Committees (VDCs), the conflict data records some


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DO ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES SHAPE VI-
OLENT AND ABUSIVE ADULT BEHAVIOR?
2.1 Introduction
Family violence is one of the most common and yet, one of the most challenging
economic, public health, and law enforcement issues. This type of violence occurs
within the most intimate of relationships and often manifests as spousal abuse
and child maltreatment. Though domestic violence is a global issue, its prevalence
is staggeringly high in low-income countries. Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is
reported to be around 38 percent for South-East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa
compared to 23.3 percent for high-income countries (WHO, 2013). Likewise, mal-
treatment of children by a family member is also tragically common; 8 out of
10 children (aged 2-14) in developing countries experience violent disciplining by
their caregivers (Erten and Keskin, 2017).1 The pervasive nature of family vio-
lence also makes it costly (Fang et al., 2012), but these costs are not just limited to
immediate adverse physical effects. For instance, child abuse and neglect has been
shown to have negative effects on the human capital accumulation of children, es-
pecially on health outcomes.2 The detrimental effects of family violence are not
1The inability of parents to protect their children from child labor, especially the hazardous
form, is another method of perpetrating child abuse and neglect. As of 2016, 19.4 percent of
children in low-income countries were working as child labor out of which 8.8 percent were in
hazardous work (ILO, 2017).
2Child maltreatment and neglect has also been shown to have detrimental effect on child-
hood health outcomes (Morales and Singh, 2015) and later life physical health (Cicchetti and
Rogosch, 2001); mental health such as post-traumatic stress disorder (Browne and Finkelhor,
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just limited to children. Even a moderate form of spousal abuse has undesirable
short and long-run consequences both for the victim and her children.3
Family violence comes with a heavy economic burden and, hence, it is crucial
to understand what amplifies or curtails this behavior. The existing literature
on domestic violence focuses on contemporaneous effects like the relationship be-
tween income and spousal abuse (Haushofer et al., 2019); however, relatively less
is known about the long-run determinants of these behaviors, especially those
related to the perpetration of child abuse and neglect. In this paper, I explore
the long-run determinants of family violence by linking exposure to adverse cir-
cumstances in childhood to the perpetration of abuse and neglect against children
and spouse in adulthood. My focus on childhood experiences is consonant with
growing evidence in economics that any influences during this period have a last-
ing impact on adult outcomes and behavior (Adhvaryu et al., 2014; Akresh et al.,
2017). Additionally, correlation studies in psychology suggest that stress gener-
ated through traumatic childhood experiences is a crucial risk factor in triggering
violence against own family in adulthood (Conger et al., 2012; Thornberry et al.,
2012; Saile et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, the causal direction of this effect remains largely unexplored and
is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, exposure to negative experiences in
childhood may affect mental health (Singhal, 2018), education, and labor market
outcomes (Almond et al., 2018), which may introduce other stressors in adult life
1986; Moeller et al., 1993; De Bellis and Thomas, 2003; Dube et al., 2003; Holmes and Sammel,
2005) and increased risk for adult criminality (Currie and Tekin, 2006). Hazardous and stressful
child labor too can have a negative effect on mental health through similar channels related to
trauma. Child labor also negatively affects childhood health by exacerbating malnutrition and
exposing children to environmental hazards (Parker, 1997; O’Donnell et al., 2002; Forastieri,
2002) and these effects persist into adulthood (Kassouf et al., 2001).
3IPV is associated with diminished current health, increase in depressive symptoms and
substance use, and a higher risk of developing a chronic disease and chronic mental illness of the
victim (Coker et al., 2002; Campbell, 2002). Domestic violence influences the mother’s health-
seeking behavior which has a negative effect on the physical health of her children (Yount et al.,
2011). Likewise, children exposed to spousal abuse at home are more likely to develop emotional
and behavioral problems (Holt et al., 2008).
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– this may increase the risk of perpetration of abuse and neglect against family
members. On the other hand, the ability to cope with difficult situations early
in life can make one fully appreciate family relationships (Tedeschi and Calhoun,
2004) and change one’s attitude toward violent behavior – this may result in lower
perpetration of family violence in adulthood. This paper explores the causal
relationship between childhood circumstances and later-life violent behavior in
the context of Nepal.
To investigate this relationship, I leverage exposure to a large adverse shock,
i.e., an armed conflict or a civil war, in childhood. In particular, I examine the
effect of men’s exposure to the Nepalese Civil War (1996-2006) in childhood on the
perpetration of family violence in adulthood. My data on armed conflict comes
from a unique database of victims from the Nepalese Civil War which includes
the date and the location of every war-related casualty. I then merge this data
with post-conflict nationally representative surveys to access information on adult
outcomes.
For identification, I exploit spatial and temporal variation in men’s childhood
exposure to armed conflict at the village or municipality level.4 Using exposure to
conflict at the village or municipality level allows conflict-related events to be local
enough to influence behavioral outcomes. To construct the childhood exposure
variable, I take advantage of the information on the exact month and the year
of birth of individuals and the dates of conflict-related events at the local level.
Intuitively, I exploit the fact that individuals born in the same month and year
but in different localities were exposed to varying intensities of armed-conflict.
Likewise, those born in the same locality but in different months and years were
also exposed to conflict differentially. This gives me a setting for a quasi-natural
experiment where exposure is defined as deaths per thousand population in a
4Village Development (VDCs) and Municipalities which are the second-lowest administrative
units in Nepal.
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village or a municipality.
I find that exposure to local-level conflict during ages 0 to 16 led to a decrease
in a man’s perpetration of spousal violence during adulthood. The estimated
effects are substantial: a one standard deviation increase in husband’s childhood
conflict exposure decreases the number of reported intimate partner violence acts
by 21 percent of the sample mean of the number of reported acts. My findings
also reveal that the wife of an exposed man is less likely to experience different
forms of spousal violence like, physical and sexual abuse. Exposed men are also
less likely to display non-physical coercive behaviors like control over the wife’s
network of friends and family.
Father’s exposure to conflict during his childhood also reduces the use of phys-
ical and psychological methods for disciplining children within the household. A
one standard deviation increase in father’s exposure decreases the use of phys-
ical violence on children by roughly 3 percent and psychological aggression by
4 percent of their respective sample means. Another way child maltreatment
and neglect manifests is through child labor which tends to violate the most basic
child rights. Parents have considerable power over child time allocation outcomes.
While making these decisions, parents may fail to internalize the harm that labor
might have on their children’s welfare. I show that a one standard deviation in-
crease in childhood conflict exposure of the father reduces the total hours worked
by his child in market/non-market activities by 1 hour (8% of the sample mean).
This is largely driven by the drop in hours worked in economic activities and
fetching for water/collecting firewood.
Though not all activities that children engage in within or outside the house-
hold are exploitative, there are few activities that are considered to be “hazardous
by nature or circumstance”. These activities involve working in a dangerous and
unhealthy environment, that exposes children to further physical, sexual, and
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psychological abuse.5 I also show that an increase in father’s conflict exposure by
one standard deviation decreases the probability of his child engaging in activities
that require carrying heavy loads (a form of hazardous activity) by roughly 8.4
percent of the sample mean.
Related literature and contribution
This study is closely related to the literature in economics that explores “early
life” shocks and the formation of later life preferences and behavior. Childhood
trauma experienced through war shapes preferences by changing the parameters
of utility functions (Kim and Lee, 2012; Voors et al., 2012). These shifts in
preferences affect later life decision making, and behavior. Evidence from child-
soldiering shows that childhood exposure to violence alters political beliefs and
increases political participation and community engagement later on (Blattman,
2009; Adhvaryu et al., 2014). Additionally, girls abducted into combating dis-
played resilience and less aggressive social behavior later on despite experiencing
high psychological distress (Annan et al., 2011). However, evidence on the effects
of “early life” shocks on behaviors is mixed. Women who were exposed to armed
conflict in their childhood are more likely to normalize the use of aggressive be-
havior by their partners and are also more likely to be the victims of domestic
violence (Mattina and Shemyakina, 2017). This study makes an importation con-
tribution to this growing literature by being the first to establish a causal link
between childhood exposure to war and later-life perpetration of family violence,
especially child abuse and neglect.
The second strand of literature that this paper contributes to is the limited
research on the inter-generational transmission of shocks in parents’ early life.
Children of women who were exposed to the Biafran war during their adolescence
faced a higher risk of neonatal and infant mortality and were also more likely to
5As pointed out in many studies, domestic violence perpetrated toward children is the most
common determinant of hazardous child labor (Catani et al., 2009; Makhoul et al., 2004)
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be stunted and underweight (Akresh et al., 2017). Likewise, women exposed to
disease environment or weaker health at birth and during early childhood were
likely to give birth to children with low birth weights (Currie and Moretti, 2007;
Almond et al., 2012). Existing psychology literature, without making any causal
inference, shows that exposure to trauma due to being physically abused as a
child, war or natural disaster potentially contributes to parental perpetration of
abuse against children (Craig and Sprang (2007), Saile et al. (2014)) affecting their
cognitive and non-cognitive development. I add to this literature by focusing on
the persistence of inter-generational causal impacts of adverse parental childhood
circumstances due to war on child abuse and time-allocation outcomes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I elaborate on
the Nepalese Civil War. In Section 2.3, I discuss the main data sources that I use
in the chapter. Section 2.4 lays out the empirical strategy, Sections 2.5 and 2.6
present the main results and Section 2.7 outlines robustness checks. Section 2.8
concludes this chapter..
2.2 Background
The Nepalese civil war
On February 13, 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) formally
launched a rebellion against the government termed as the “People’s War”. This
resulted in a prolonged armed conflict between the CPN-M forces and the gov-
ernment of Nepal that lasted until the Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed
in 2006. During this period over 13,000 people were killed and about 1,300 went
missing (UN, 2012).6
6Different sources provide different estimates for this figure. The government claims that
a total of 12,686 individuals were killed; although, since the State was actively involved in
killings during this period, the government has an incentive to under-report. While the National
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Historically, Nepal was governed as an absolute monarchy. During the early
1990s, Nepal transitioned to a constitutional monarchy, following a pro-democracy
movement – the Jana Andolan (“People’s Movement”) – that witnessed the uni-
fication of various political parties towards the establishment of a constitutional
framework. The “People’s Movement” led to the establishment of multiparty
democracy and voting rights, and in November 1990, the new constitution was
drafted. This raised expectations of social progress, and some historians believe
that this was one of the factors that contributed to the onset of internal conflict
in 1996. Over the course of the next ten years, acts of violence and destruction,
human rights abuses, and mass killings by both, government forces and the CPN-
M forces, were committed across Nepal’s 75 districts.7 Appendix 1.A shows the
general time-line of key events during this civil war.
The CPN-M militia served under the leadership of a Chairman, who was also
the Supreme Commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was
formed in September 2001. According to a UN (2012) report, the Maoist militia
had between 5,000 to 10,000 active combatants throughout the period of con-
flict and towards the end had expanded to multiple divisions across the country
that was organized under three commands that were under the authority of the
Supreme Commands and four Deputy Commanders. The PLA’s playbook in-
cluded guerrilla attacks, and sabotage and propaganda actions, such as random
destruction and seizure of property (Shrestha, 1997).
Apart from the CPN-M militia, the government’s forces were also actively
involved during the conflict period to fight against the PLA. Initially, since the
conflict was seen as a minor threat, the Nepal Police (NP) was mobilized in
Geographic Magazine also reports a similar figure as the government’s (Bendiksen and Douglas,
2005), I identify 13,247 killings from my microdata.
7With the exception of two districts – Manang and Mustang – all other districts witnessed
conflict-related killings. Manang and Mustangs districts are both high-altitude trans-Himalayan
regions and very sparsely populated.
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order to contain the insurgency. In 2001, the Armed Police Force of Nepal, a
paramilitary force, was set up in order to fight the insurgents due to the growing
power of the Maoist forces. The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) was not deployed
by the government until late 2001 citing that the insurgency was a law and order
problem that was to be addressed by the Nepal Police. My microdata covers
victims of violence from both sides of the conflict.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Microdata on civil war
The data on victims from the Nepalese Civil War was collected by the Informal
Sector Service Center (INSEC), a non-governmental organization based in Nepal
that works with human rights issues.8 This was compiled from qualitative records
from investigations of international human rights violations and international hu-
manitarian law violations during the ten-year insurgency and are cross-referenced
in the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner’s Nepal
Conflict Archive9. The data maintained by INSEC has been used in previous
studies, like those by Do and Iyer (2010)10 and Shrestha (2017), and is, as per my
knowledge, the most reliable and impartial database on conflict intensity during
the civil war. It is also unique in nature since it is a census of a known population
of victims from the war. The unit of observation is an individual victim. The
data also provides information on whether the victim was killed, injured, or dis-
appeared along with information on the location and the exact date of the violent
8This database is unique in that it is a census of victims from domestic conflict and is
compiled by an impartial entity–Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC). This is important
since both the Nepali government and the Maoist forces were actively involved in killings and
acts of violence throughout this period. It is only reasonable to suspect that if the government
were to build a similar database, it would necessarily try to underplay its role in the civil war.
9http://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org
10I use geographically granular data on conflict than this study.
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event.
Out of 3,915 Village Development Committees (VDCs) and municipalities, the
conflict data records some violent events for 2,427 of them. Figure 1.B.1 shows all
the villages marked in darker shades for which some kind of conflict-related event
has been recorded in the INSEC data. Figure 1.3 shows district11 level spatial
and temporal variation in conflict related events from the start of this war to its
end12. Violent events first started in districts like Rukum and Rolpa and slowly
started spreading in neighboring districts with varying and greater intensity (as
it goes from lighter to darker shades). Here, for each individual map, I define
intensity as conflict related events (deaths, killing or disappearances) per 1000
population within a district for the given time frame.
The INSEC data reports 14,959 fatalities, of which 13,247 were killings, 932
were disappearances, and 780 were instances when the victim sustained disabil-
ity inducing injuries.13 Figures 1.1 depicts the three major outcomes of violent
events (killed, disappeared, or injured). More than half the number of deaths were
caused by the government’s forces. Figure 1.2(a) summarizes the distribution of
deaths over the period of the conflict by perpetrator (State, Maoist, and Oth-
ers). This data also captures the delayed involvement of the Nepali government’s
forces in the civil war. Specifically after 2001, once the army was deployed, the
number of deaths due to the State were strikingly higher than those caused by
the Maoists. Figure 1.2(b) depicts the causes of these deaths as recorded in the
INSEC database. In this figure, serious nature deaths were caused by heinous
killings that involved prolonged torture of the victim by the perpetrator. By
construction the data excludes acts of violence where people were not killed or
11VDCs (rural) and municipalities (urban) are the second lowest administrative units in Nepal.
Collection of VDCs and municipalities make up a district.
12Although this district level breakdown of conflict intensity provides information on ge-
ographical variation in conflict across time, my analysis actually uses Village Development
Committees (VDCs) and municipalities level conflict.
13Author’s calculation
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injured, or did not disappear. For instance, if a building was torched and nobody
was affected, this data would not record such an incident. To this extent, it in-
cludes only victimization from conflict and not a broader set of threat to property
and life due to conflict.
2.3.2 Data on family violence and child time allocation
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data
To study the effects of adverse childhood conditions on perpetration of spousal
abuse, I use the DHS-2016 survey. I use the Individual Recode which contains
information on a nationally representative cross-section of women aged 15 to 49
at the time of the survey. A random sample of these women was also surveyed on
their experiences of sexual, physical, and emotional spousal abuse under the Do-
mestic Violence module. In accord with the World Health Organizations (WHO)
guidelines, the module can be only implemented if absolute privacy can be ob-
tained and maintained throughout the interview time frame. The DHS uses the
modified Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) to measure spousal violence. Instead of ask-
ing one single question on whether a woman was victimized or not, modified CTS
asks a series of questions on different acts of spousal violence. This reduces the
probability of violence measure being affected by different understandings among
women of what constitutes a violent act. Likewise, it also gives respondents mul-
tiple opportunities to disclose the experience of violence. The outcome variables
of interest and their components are included in Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A.
The female recode of the DHS that includes the violence variables does not
include information on the husband’s month and year of birth which is essential to
define my exposure variable. Unfortunately, not all women aged 15-49 who were
interviewed had their partner selected for the male module. Therefore, I limit my
analysis to those women whose husbands or partners were interviewed under the
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men’s module. This matched data-set allows me to understand the effect of hus-
band’s childhood exposure on his wife’s experience of intimate partner violence.
Additionally, I use the Male Recode of DHS-2016 which provides information on
men’s attitude toward domestic violence.
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
In order to study the impact on inter-generational outcomes, I use data from
the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2014. This is a cross-sectional survey de-
signed to assess the situation of children and women in Nepal and also covers a
range of household characteristics including asset ownership. The household ques-
tionnaire of this survey includes a module on Child Labor which was administered
to one randomly selected child (aged 5-17) in the sampled households with one
or more children aged 1-17. If the randomly selected child was aged 1-14 years,
then the Child Discipline module was also administered.
Respondents to the household questionnaire were asked a series of questions on
the methods used by adults in the household to discipline the selected child during
the month preceding the survey. The child labor module includes questions on
the type of work and the number of hours engaged in it. Data on child work were
collected on both economic activities (paid or unpaid work within or outside the
household) and domestic work (household chores, such as cooking, cleaning, caring
for children, collecting firewood, or fetching water). The survey does not provide
any information on the industry of employment and the associated compensation
or wages provided. The module also collects information on “hazardous form
of child labor” 14 comprising work that exposes children to dangerous working
14The suggested definition of hazardous child labor by ILO includes “(a) work which exposes
children to physical, psychological, or sexual abuse; (b) work underground, under water, at
dangerous heights, or in confined spaces; (c) work with dangerous machinery, equipment and
tools, or which involves the handling or transport of heavy loads; (d) work in an unhealthy
environment which may, for example, expose children to hazardous substances, agents or pro-
cesses, or to temperature, noise levels, or vibrations damaging to their health; (e) work under
particularly difficult conditions such as work for long hours or during the night or work where
the child is unreasonably confined to the premises or the employer.” (Edmonds, 2007)
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conditions and substances which are potentially damaging to their health and
which exposes them to maltreatment. Table 2.A.2 describes the construction of
these variables of interest from the MICS survey.
Lastly, a man might have a greater influence on his child’s upbringing if he
lives in the same household as his children. Therefore, in my sample, I include
only those children whose father lives in the same household as them.
2.3.3 Population Census of Nepal
In addition, I use the 2011 wave of Nepal’s national population census to access
local level birth cohorts size. In order to weight the number of victims by village(or
municipality) level population, I use the census wave of 2001.
2.3.4 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the variables on spousal violence from
the DHS. As seen in Panel A, 21 percent of female respondents reported to expe-
riencing at least one act of less severe physical violence ever perpetrated by their
spouse. Likewise, 10 percent of them experienced some kind of severe physical
violence. Sexual violence and emotional abuse against women by their partners
is also high in my sample at 8 and 10 percent, respectively.
Another way male dominance over his partner can manifest is through a display
of controlling behaviors, such as frequent expression of jealousy or accusation of
infidelity, limiting contact with friends or family, and insisting on knowing where
she is at all times. Panel B of Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for whether
the husbands of women surveyed in the DHS displayed such behaviors. Nearly 22
percent of women experienced constant jealously or accusation of being unfaithful.
Approximately, 16 percent of them reported that their husbands exert control over
their social network, i.e., they are frequently prohibited from meeting their female
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friends or their contact with family members is limited by their spouse.
Table 2.2 presents the sample mean and standard deviation (s.d.) of key vari-
ables from the MICS, 2014 survey for the full sample.15 My full sample includes
only those children whose father is currently present in the household. As seen
in Panel A of Table 2.2, 50 percent of children aged 1 to 14 in my sample experi-
enced violent physical disciplining; whereas 30 percent of them were exposed to
psychological aggression.
Panel B of Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics for time allocated to
various activities. On average, children aged 5 to 17 work 12.4 hours per week
in market or non-market activities. The largest portion of working hours, at
5.3 hours per week, is dedicated toward domestic chores like cooking, cleaning,
washing clothes, caring for young and elderly, and other daily household tasks.
These children spent, on average, 4.7 hours per week on economic activities. These
activities involve wager or non wage agricultural work , animal husbandry, helping
family or relative’s business, and so on. Finally, 2.4 hours per week is spent on
fetching water or collecting firewood. The statistics in Panel C show that 30
percent of children are involved in carrying heavy loads which, according to ILO,
is classified as a hazardous form of child labor. Additionally, about 4 percent of
children aged 5 to 17 reported working with dangerous tools or operating heavy
machinery.
Finally, Table 2.3 provides summary statistics on man’s conflict exposure. My
measure of conflict intensity is calculated as the number of conflict-related casu-
alties per thousand population in a village/municipality where the man resides at
the time of the survey. On average, the fathers of the children in the MICS sample
were exposed to 0.14 casualties per thousand population between ages 0-16, with
most exposed fathers experiencing approximately 45 casualties per thousand pop-
15Table 2.A.4 provides the statistics for rural sample.
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ulation. Likewise, husbands/partners of women in the DHS sample experienced
0.41 casualties per thousand population.16
2.4 Empirical strategy
2.4.1 Overview of strategy
The large number of studies on early life shocks mostly focus on fetal or in-utero
origin of later life outcomes. However, there is growing evidence that childhood
is a formative and critical period for the formation of preferences, attitudes, and
beliefs (Sears and Valentino, 1997; Adhvaryu et al., 2014). Akresh et al. (2017)
find a significant negative impact on adult life outcomes of women’s war exposure
at ages 0 to 16. Likewise, only conflict exposure from age 7-20 had a lasting impact
on motivation and behavioral outcomes in an experimental dictator game (Bauer
et al., 2014). Therefore, I examine the effect of exposure to conflict between the
ages 0-16 on adult outcomes.17
The variation in conflict exposure that I exploit is across time and geographical
space. Section 2.3.1 shows that different regions of Nepal witnessed conflict-
related events at different time periods with varying intensities. To construct a
man’s childhood exposure variable, I take advantage of the information on the
exact month and the year of birth of individuals and the dates of conflict-related
events at the local level. Men who were born in different months and years but in
the same location were differentially exposed to conflict events up to the age of 16.
Figure 2.2 shows this variation in childhood conflict exposure18 at a given location
across birth-year cohorts.19 In this map, darker the shade of an administrative
16 Panel D of Tables 2.A.3 and 2.A.4 reports the summary statistics on father’s and husband’s
conflict exposure at age less than 16 for respective rural samples.
17Later on, for robustness check, I also increase the age cutoff to 18 and 20 years.
18Conflict exposure is measured as number of casualties and other violent events per thousand
population in a village or a municipality.
19My actual variation is based on not only year of birth but also month.
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area, higher is the standard deviation of conflict exposure across men born in
different years in that location.
Another source of variation arises from the fact that not all villages and munic-
ipalities in Nepal were affected equally at a particular point in time. Therefore,
men born in the same month and year but at two different locations were exposed
to varying intensity of conflict-related events at age 16 or below. To illustrate
this variation, for each birth-year, Figure 2.3 plots the standard deviation of con-
flict intensity across VDCs and municipalities. Taken together, these two figures
show the variation that I exploit in order to identify the long-run and the inter-
generational effects of negative childhood experiences.
Finally, my focus on men’s childhood exposure rather than women’s exposure
has two justifications. First, in developing countries with patriarchal values, a fa-
ther/husband has a big influence on parental and household decision-making (Jay-
achandran, 2015). Second, three-quarters of domestic violence against women is
perpetrated by their male domestic partner (Aizer, 2010). Violence against family
is highly likely if used by men as a mechanism to control families, extract resources
and income, or as an expressive behavior that provides them with positive utility
(Card and Dahl, 2011; Haushofer et al., 2019).
2.4.2 Specification
To formally examine the effects of adverse childhood circumstances experienced
by men, I estimate the following specification:
Yijmtl = ↵ +   exposurejmtl + ✓
0
Xij +  l +  t + ✏ijmtl (2.1)
where Yijmtl is an outcome variable for a woman (or a child) i married to
a husband (or born to a father) j who was born in month m of year t and
is living in location l at the time of the survey. Here, l can be a VDC or a
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municipality which are Nepal’s second-lowest administrative units. The main
variable of interest, exposurejmtl, is exposure to conflict, which is measured as the
number of casualties per thousand population in location l when j was between
ages 0 to 16. To construct conflict intensity, I use the information on the month
and the year of birth of the husband (or father) which allows me to measure this
exposure variable more precisely. Xij is the set of household and individual level
controls that depend on whether the outcome variable is related to children or
women. All specifications include household size, wealth score, and dummies for
ethnicity variables. The coefficient of interest,  , measures the effect of a unit
increase in conflict exposure on the outcome variable of interest. ✏ijmtl is the error
term of the regression model. Finally, I estimate all regressions using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the village or municipality
level.
A key issue in this type of study is that individuals might select themselves
into areas that are prone to war. Also, localities that are more likely to experience
conflict-related events may share certain characteristics that also affect abusive be-
havior in adulthood. To control for unobservable location-specific characteristics
driving both armed-conflict and adult outcomes, I include location fixed effects
( l). Including location fixed effects, however, only controls for time-invariant
area-specific-factors. If older men are more likely to justify child abuse or spousal
violence than younger men, including just location fixed effects fails to control
for this. I, therefore, take advantage of village(municipality)-specific variation
in conflict events across time to include year of birth fixed effects.  t denotes
fixed effects for man’s year of birth which controls for non-linear trends across my
sample. In other words,  t controls for location-invariant unobservable charac-
teristics like attitudes, beliefs or norms common to individuals born in the same
year. Lastly, I also run another specification that includes region-specific linear
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time trends ( r ⇥ t).20 Region-specific linear time trends are included in order to
capture unobservable characteristics that vary across regions and over time. For
instance, men born in different years and regions of the country can be exposed
to different policies (like education) that affect their behavior.
For a causal interpretation of my results, it is crucial for the conflict exposure
variable to be exogenous. To provide support for the exogeneity of this vari-
able, I check whether individuals appear to be observably different at the time
of the survey based on how much conflict they were exposed to in childhood. In
other words, I check for whether there is any selection on observables in my data.
Specifically, I regress the various demographic variables that I use as controls on
childhood conflict exposure while controlling for year and location fixed effects.
Following Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013), if location and year fixed effects in-
cluded in this regression also sufficiently control for selection, then we should not
see any significant effects of conflict exposure on demographic characteristics. Ta-
ble 2.A.5 reports results for this regression. Across a total of 60 coefficients, only
6 are significant at the 10 percent level, out of which only 2 are significant at the 5
percent level. The magnitude of two coefficients significant at the 5 percent level
is too low to be a cause for concern. This suggests that controlling for location
and birth year fixed effects actually do a good job of controlling for differences
among individuals exposed to conflict.
Another threat to the causal interpretation of the   coefficient is migration.
Armed-conflicts and wars often lead to dislocation and migration. If men who are
more likely to be violent, are also more likely to migrate out due to conflict, then
the induced endogeneity might lead to biased results. I have attempted to address
this issue of migration in several ways. Firstly, following Currie and Rossin-Slater
(2013), the test for whether individuals in my sample appeared to be observably
20Districts in Nepal were grouped into five development regions.
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different based on conflict exposure also addresses the possibility of endogenous
migration. The results reported in Table 2.3 do not raise any concerns in this
regard. Secondly, for the DHS sample, I restrict my analysis to only those men
who have lived in the same village/municipality for more than 10 years. This
includes all individuals who have lived in the area since before 2006. I include
the ones who have lived in the area for greater than 10 years to not exclude those
men who migrated into the area at a very young age (since this conflict lasted
for 10 years) and whose behavior is likely to be affected by conflict. Nevertheless,
96.3% of the sample who have lived in the location for more than 10 years were
also residing in the same place even before the conflict started. Unfortunately, I
am unable to observe neither the place of birth nor the number of years lived in
the current location for my MICS sample. In section 2.7, I further examine other
migration-related threats.
2.5 Effects on wife
2.5.1 Intimate partner violence
In this section, I study the effect of a man’s exposure to negative childhood
circumstances on his wife’s experience of domestic violence perpetrated by him.
The results for spousal violence are presented in Table 2.4. Columns [1]-[2] and
[5]-[6] report results for various domestic violence outcome variables for my full
sample, whereas columns [3]-[4] and [7]-[8] present estimated coefficients for the
rural sub-sample. I pursue this particular sub-sample analysis because, during the
civil war, most of the rural areas were Maoist strongholds whereas the government
had more control over cities (Do and Iyer, 2010). Hence, conflict might have
disrupted lives more in rural areas. Columns [1]-[2] of Panel A report results
for the number of acts of spousal violence (physical, sexual, or emotional) that
56
a woman being interviewed reported as ever experienced. As seen in Column
[1], a one standard deviation(s.d.) increase in husband’s conflict exposure, which
is equal to 1.93 casualties per thousand population (Table 2.3), decreases the
number of reported acts by (0.209 ⇤ 1.93 =)0.403, or 41.4 percent of the sample
mean. This result is largely driven by the drop spousal violence in the rural
sample.
Column [1] of Panel B shows that an increase in one s.d. in man’s conflict
exposure reduces the probability of less severe physical violence by 4.43 (= 0.023⇤
1.93) percent points, or by 9.4 percent of the sample mean. Exposed men are
also less likely to commit severe physical spousal violence which includes acts
like kicking or dragging, trying to choke or burn on purpose, or attacking with
weapons. Column [5] of Panel C shows that an increase in conflict exposure at
ages 0-16 by one s.d., decreases the probability of carrying out severe physical
violence by 3.7 (= 0.019 ⇤ 1.93) percent points, or by roughly 35 percent of the
sample mean.
Column [1] of Panel D presents the result for sexual violence perpetrated by
the husband, which includes any acts of forced (physically or by threat) sexual in-
tercourse or any other sexual acts. A one s.d. increase in the husband’s childhood
conflict exposure, reduces the likelihood of him committing sexual violence by 4.82
(= 0.025 ⇤ 1.93) percent points. Compared to the sample mean, the magnitude
of this drop is very large, at roughly 62 percent. For both measures of physical
violence along with sexual violence, the results are similar in magnitude and sig-
nificance for the rural sample. Though negative in sign, there is no significant
effect of husband’s childhood conflict exposure on the experience of emotional
violence by women for my full sample. However, the negative impact of conflict
intensity on emotional violence is slightly larger in magnitude and significant at
ten percent level of significance for the rural sample.
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Tables 2.A.6, 2.A.7, 2.A.8, and 2.A.9 report the effects separately for each indi-
vidual component of less severe physical violence, severe physical violence, sexual
violence, and emotional violence. The results are similar, i.e, all the estimated
coefficients are negative. There is a statistically significant reduction in most com-
mon acts of spousal violence like being slapped, hair getting pulled/arms getting
twisted, getting punched, being dragged, kicked, or beaten up, physically forced
for sexual intercourse, and getting humiliated in front of others.
2.5.2 Controlling behaviors
In a patriarchal society like Nepal, men can also use other coercive instruments like
displaying controlling behavior in addition to explicit violence. Execution of con-
trolling behavior in an intimate partner relationship can have equally detrimental
effects like those resulting from physical or sexual violence. In fact, these behav-
iors are often precursors to other forms of intimate partner violence. Therefore,
I check for whether adverse experience in childhood also affects the probability
that a husband displays controlling behaviors toward his wife. Panel A in Table
2.5 reports the effect of man’s conflict exposure between ages 0-16 on the likeli-
hood of him getting constantly jealous if his wife talks to other men or accusing
her of being unfaithful. The estimated coefficients for my full sample and rural
sub-sample are consistently negative, though statistically insignificant.
Seeking help for issues related to domestic violence is still not common. How-
ever, if women do seek help or want to confide about being victimized by their
spouse, they are more likely to do so with their own friends or family. In the
DHS, among women who have experienced some form of domestic violence and
sought help, approximately 65 percent answered that their most common source
of help is family while 22 percent of them sought help from friends. However, if a
man exerts control over his spouse’s social network, i.e., is limits her contact with
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family or friends, it is likely to create an obstacle for women who need to seek
help. Panel B shows that husband’s exposure to conflict from ages 0-16 decreases
the probability of a married woman experiencing forced social isolation. A one
s.d. increase in exposure decreases the likelihood of this particular controlling be-
havior by roughly 3.5 (= 0.018⇤1.93) percent. This result is similar in magnitude
for the rural sample.
2.6 Effects on children
2.6.1 Child abuse
In this section, I study the causal effect of a man’s exposure to armed conflict from
ages 0 to 16 on his child’s experience of physical and psychological disciplining. My
child abuse variable comes from the MICS, 2014. This survey provides information
on whether the selected child for the module experienced some form of disciplining
that uses either physical force or verbal intimidation. Unfortunately, it does not
provide information on who perpetrated such disciplinary practices. Nevertheless,
given that Nepal is a patriarchal society and fathers play an important role in
decision making about children, it is important to study the effect of a man’s
exposure on child abuse. Studies of child abuse in the United States have shown
that fathers are as likely as mothers to perpetrate child abuse (Zigler and Hall,
1989; Coohey, 2000). Even in countries like Turkey, the prevalence of violence
against children committed by fathers is high, at 19 percent (Erten and Keskin,
2017).
Table 2.6 reports the estimated effect of a man’s exposure to armed conflict
in his childhood on the use of physical and psychological violence as disciplining
methods against his children. The reported coefficients are the estimated  ’s
of equation (3.1). Column [1] of Panel A shows the impact on physical abuse.
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A one s.d. increase in conflict exposure, which is equal to 1.1 casualties per
thousand population (Table 2.3), decreases the use of physical violence on children
by 0.013⇤1.09 = 0.0141 or 1.41 percentage points. Column [3] of Panel A displays
the estimate for the rural sample. The coefficient is negative and significant for
this sample and it largely drives the estimate observed in Column [1].
In Column [1] of Panel B, I report the effect of exposure to conflict on the
perpetration of psychological abuse against children. An increase in father’s con-
flict exposure by one s.d., decreases psychological aggression against children by
0.012 ⇤ 1.109 = 0.0133 or 1.33 percentage points. This is equivalent to roughly 4
percent of the sample mean. Column [3] in Panel B shows that the effect is similar
in magnitude and significance for the rural sub-sample. Table 2.A.10 reports the
estimates from equation (3.1 )for constructive disciplining which involves parents
explaining children why their behavior is wrong. Though the coefficient reported
in Column [1] of Panel A is positive, it is small in magnitude compared to the
sample mean and not statistically significant.
2.6.2 Child labor
Another way child maltreatment and neglect manifests is through child labor
which tends to violate the most basic child rights. Though a significant number
of children go to both school and work, engaging in stressful labor can negatively
impact their overall development. Next, I estimate the effect of father’s conflict
exposure on the time use and work of his children. Children have limited authority
to adjust their own labor supply and their time allocation decisions on work
outside/inside home are mostly made by adults. (Edmonds, 2007) argues that one
of the reasons why child labor is considered a major human rights issue is because
parents have considerable decision-making power over child time allocation. While
making these decisions, parents may fail to internalize the harm that work might
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have on children’s own welfare.
The theory of the instrumental use of violence argues that men use domestic
violence as an instrument to extract rent from women as well as to control their
behavior. The extent of violence perpetrated by a man largely depends on the
participation constraints of the woman which depends on her outside options and
hence, her ability to leave the marriage. Theories on domestic violence, as per my
knowledge, do not study motives for perpetrating child abuse. Mainly, children
do not have outside options and are obliged to stay with their parents. Imposing
a participation constraint in this scenario does not seem to be plausible. This
allows fathers to easily use violence as a mechanism to make their children work
and extract income, rent, goods, or services for consumption from them.
Next, I estimate the effect of father’s conflict exposure on time use of his
children. In Table 3.6, I show the results for equation 3.1 on hours spent on various
economic and domestic activities in the last 7 days. Column [1] of Panel A reports
that a one standard deviation increase in conflict exposure of the father at age 16
or less, reduces the total hours worked by approximately 1 hour ( 0.904 ⇤ 1.1 =
0.99444). This impact is roughly 8% of the sample mean. The coefficient observed
in Column [1] in Panel A is largely driven by the drop in hours worked in economic
activities and fetching water or collecting firewood. As seen in Column [3] of
Panel B, an increase in exposure by one standard deviation leads to a statistically
significant decrease in hours worked in economic activities (in the past 7 days)
by 33 minutes on average. The largest impact, however, is on hours spent in
fetching water/collecting firewood. Fetching for water or collecting firewood in
Nepal requires long commuting time and is an arduous task as it requires carrying
heavy loads. As observed in Column [1] of Panel C, on average, a one standard
deviation increase in conflict exposure decreases hours spent in water or firewood
collection by 0.5 hours (30 minutes) which is 20% of the reported sample mean.
61
Though children spent a significant amount of time on domestic work (5.31 on
average) father’s conflict exposure in childhood has no significant impact on this
activity.
2.6.3 Hazardous child labor
However, not all activities outside schooling performed by children are classified
as child labor.21 There are activities that children do within a household that are
neither harmful nor exploitative. Nevertheless, a child who is less than 17 years
of age and is forced to participate in activities that are “hazardous by nature
or circumstance” for 1 or more hours per week is considered to be child labor
(Edmonds, 2007).
Next I estimate the effect of a man’s exposure to conflict from ages 0-16 on
the likelihood of his child’s involvement in harmful working conditions. I do this
for two important reasons. Firstly, engaging a child in a hazardous form of labor
that exposes him/her to dangerous situation is itself considered to be a form
of child abuse and neglect. As children have limited authority to adjust their
own labor supply, they are mostly engaged in hazardous activities by adults,
especially if they live in the same household as their parents. Secondly, the
psychology literature has often pointed out that physical violence perpetrated
towards children is the most common determinant of dangerous form of child
labor (Catani et al. (2009), Makhoul et al. (2004)).
In Table 2.8, I show the results from equation (3.1) for the effects on hazardous
form of child labor. Panel A reports estimates for hazardous economic activities
(with or without pay) which involves carrying heavy loads. As reported in Column
21The current Child Labor Prohibition Act prohibits children below 14 years of age in en-
gaging in any work. However, it does not differentiate between domestic work and child labor.
Nevertheless, the act does state that children aged 15 – 17 years shall not be engaged in work
for more than six hours a day and more than 36 hours a week, either with or without additional
wages.
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[1] of this panel, a one s.d. increase in conflict intensity lowers the probability
of a child getting involved in activities that require carrying heavy loads by 2.3
(0.021 ⇤ 1.09 = 0.023) percentage points. This impact is roughly 8.4 percent of
the sample mean. Column [3] of Panel A presents the estimated coefficient for the
rural sample. This coefficient is similar in magnitude but more significant than the
one for the full sample. Panel B of Table 2.8 presents results for hazardous child
labor which involves working with dangerous tools or operating heavy machinery.
Though the reported coefficients are negative in sign, they are not significant.
2.7 Robustness check
The results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks. First of all, I check
whether I achieve similar results by modifying the cut-off age used to define
exposure. To check for this, I increase the cut-off age for exposure to 18 and 20
years, respectively. The results are shown in Table 2.A.12 for spousal violence
and the controlling behavior outcomes and in Tables 2.A.13, 2.A.14, and 2.A.15
for child-level outcomes. For family violence and controlling behavior outcomes,
the size of each estimated coefficient decreases as I gradually increase the cutoff
age to 18 and then to 20. For ages 0-18, many of my spousal violence variables
(Table 2.A.12) are still significant but smaller compared to the cutoff age of 16;
whereas none of them are statistically significant when I increase the age to 20.
Tables 2.A.13 and 2.A.15 show that though smaller in magnitude, the estimated
coefficients are similar in significance when the cutoff age is 18 but this significance
disappears when age is increased to 20. This experiment shows that exposure
during younger age has larger and more significant effects on adult behavioral
outcomes that I study compared to exposure on later ages.
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Endogenous mortality, fertility, and migration
One of the potential concerns about a causal interpretation of my estimates
could be that of age-selective mortality and fertility. If only healthy and mentally
strong children who may be less likely to be abusive in adulthood survive due to
armed conflict, then positive selection might lead to overestimation of the true
effects. Additionally, one might be concerned that the on-going civil war can
affect the number of children born.
To assess age-selective mortality and fertility, I check for whether birth-cohort
sizes vary with conflict intensity. I use the 2011 census for this analysis as this was
the first census to be conducted after the war ended in 2006. It is also the first
census to include information on individuals who were born between 1980 to 2006
and hence, were exposed to conflict at ages 0-16. Next, I collapse the data to the
birth-year village/municipality level, i.e, for each village/municipality, I calculate
the size22 of each birth-year cohort in that particular location. If exposure to
conflict affected mortality or fertility, we would expect to see effects on cohort
size. I, therefore, regress the constructed panel of cohort size on my conflict
exposure variable, controlling for location and birth-year fixed effects.23 Table
2.A.16 reports the results for this regression. Panel A includes results for my
entire sample irrespective of gender, whereas Panel B reports the results for men
only. I do not find that exposure to conflict affected cohort sizes. The estimated
coefficients are not only insignificant but also very small in magnitude compared
to the means. This eliminates the concern that age-selective mortality or fertility
is driving my results by affecting the sample composition.
As discussed earlier, armed-conflicts and wars often lead to dislocation and
22Size is calculated in terms of fraction, i.e., total number of individuals in a particular birth-
year cohort to the total population of the village/municipality.
23The regression that I run is: cohorttl = ↵0 + ↵1exposuretl +  l +  t + ✏tl, where cohorttl is
the fraction of birth-year(t) cohort size to the population in village/municipality (l), exposuretl
is conflict exposure at ages between 0-16,  l is location fixed effect, and  t is birth-year fixed
effect.
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migration. Endogenous migration can affect the composition of my sample and
hence, is a potential confounding factor. If highly exposed men, who are also
more likely to be violent, migrate out due to conflict, then this would generate
similar results as we observed for my outcome variables of interest. I have already
attempted to address this issue of migration in Section 2.4.2. In addition to these
assessments, following Singhal (2018), the birth-cohort size analysis performed
above (Table 2.A.16) also tests for selective migration. As discussed above, I do
not find that cohort sizes respond to conflict, suggesting that migration may not
be biasing the results.
Multiple hypothesis testing
My analysis so far tests the effects of exposure to the adverse situation in
childhood on multiple outcome variables on a one-by-one basis. However, this
single inference procedure increases the probability of false positive24 rate while
testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously. One way to control for this effect is
by controlling for Family-Wise Error Rate (FWER) which is the probability of
making one or more false discoveries. This stringent approach, though widely
used, has its own limitations like less power for testing each individual outcome.
In this case a desirable error rate to control will be False Discovery Rate (FDR)
or expected proportion of false discoveries.
Table 2.A.17 reports adjusted p-values of significant outcome variables where
I control for both FWER and FDR. Columns [1] and [5] provide un-adjusted
p-values use to conduct individual inferences. Columns [2] and [6] provide p-
values adjusted for FWER using Holm (1979) step-up and Hochberg (1988) step-
down procedures. Columns [3] and [7] provide p-values for Holm’s method using
Sidak’s correction. Finally, Columns [4] and [8] provide p-values adjusted for FDR
using Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) procedure. The estimates on child abuse
24False positive occurs when we reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact true.
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and spousal partner violence and controlling behavior variables are robust to all
corrections, including the most conservative ones. The result on hazardous labor
is robust to all of these corrections for the rural sample.
2.8 Conclusion
Family violence is pervasive and has detrimental short-and long-run effects on
physical and mental health, labor market and other outcomes of the victims.
However, relatively less is known about what amplifies or curtails this behavior,
particularly in the long-run. One of the potential long-run determinants can be
exposure to an adverse situation like an armed conflict in childhood. Neverthe-
less, the causal effect of childhood experiences on later life perpetration of family
violence remains largely unexplored and is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand,
exposure to negative experiences in childhood may affect mental health, educa-
tion, and labor market outcomes, which may introduce other stressors in adult
life - this may increase the risk of perpetration of abuse and neglect against family
members. On the other hand, the ability to cope with difficult situations early
in life can make one fully appreciate family relationships and positively change
one’s attitude toward violent behavior.
This paper studies the impact of exposure to an adverse circumstance in child-
hood on adult life violent behavior toward family. In particular, I analyze the
effects of men’s exposure to armed conflict in childhood on the perpetration of
family violence, for instance, spousal violence or child abuse, in adulthood. I
explore this relationship in the context of the Nepalese Civil War (1996- 2006).
For causal identification, I leverage two things: First, growing evidence in eco-
nomics that age of exposure matters for later life behavior and second, the nature
of the civil war itself. At a fixed-point in time during the civil war, various vil-
lages or municipalities of Nepal observed varying levels of conflict-related events.
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Likewise, a village or a municipality witnessed different levels of conflict-related
events across different periods. Taken together, these facts allow me to construct
a quasi-random natural experiment where I exploit geographical and temporal
variation in conflict exposure from ages 0-16.
Perhaps surprisingly, I find that exposure to war as a boy, is associated with a
less violent man. Firstly, I find that men who were exposed to armed conflict in
childhood are less likely to perpetrate both physical and sexual forms of spousal
violence. A one standard deviation increase in childhood conflict exposure de-
creases perpetration of less severe physical violence (like slapping, pulling hair,
and so on) and severe physical violence (like kicking, dragging, hitting with ob-
jects) by roughly 9 and 35 percent of the sample mean, respectively. The drop is
substantial for sexual spousal violence at approximately 62 percent of the sample
mean. Secondly, exposed men are also less likely (by 22 percent of the sample
mean) to display non-physical coercive behavior like exerting control over wife’s
social network or relationship with family and friends. Thirdly, a one standard
deviation increase in father’s conflict exposure decreases his child’s probability of
facing violent disciplining at home by 3-4 percent of the sample mean. Addition-
ally, children of exposed fathers work fewer hours per week and are less likely to
be involved in dangerous working conditions like carrying heavy loads.
To sum up, childhood experiences matter for later life preferences, and be-
havior. However, it also crucial to understand the underlying motives for family
violence to inform policy. In my next chapter, I consider various channels driving
the results observed above and explore other long-run outcomes of exposed men.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.2: Temporal variation in conflict exposure at ages 0-16 across
birth-year cohorts for each village or municipality
Notes: In the map above, for each administrative unit (VDCs or municipalities), I plot the
standard deviation in men’s conflict exposure from ages 0-16 across birth years. Darker shades
represent higher variation. Conflict exposure (intensity) is measured as casualties/1000
population.
Figure 2.3: Spatial variation in conflict exposure at ages 0-16 for each birth-year
cohort
Notes: In the graph above, for each birth year, I provide the standard deviation in conflict
exposure from ages 0-16 across VDCs and municipalities. For this graph, I restrict birth year
from 1980-2005 as these were the cohorts who experienced conflict at ages 0-16. Conflict
exposure (intensity) is measured as casualties/1000 population.
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (DHS)
Mean SD N
Panel A: Intimate Partner Violence
No. of reported acts of
violence 0.933 2.178 1884
Ever experienced:
(any emotional violence) 0.123 0.328 1884
(any less severe physical violence) 0.212 0.409 1884
(any severe physical violence) 0.0987 0.298 1884
(any sexual violence) 0.0775 0.267 1884
Panel B: Controlling Behavior
Experienced:
(jealousy/accusation of unfaithfulness) 0.217 0.412 1883
(control over social network) 0.155 0.362 1881
Panel C: Other Variables
Age (Wife) 31.30 8.275 2422
Age (Husband) 34.81 8.279 2422
Wife’s education (years) 4.346 4.307 2422
Husband’s education (years) 6.467 3.840 2422
Household’s size 5.764 3.046 2422
Wealth 2.966 1.386 2422
Rural location 0.855 0.352 2422
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for DHS (2016) data. Panel A reports the summary statistics for
spousal violence. No. of reported acts of violence is a continuous variable and it is the total count of different individual acts of
spousal violence (physical, sexual, or emotional) that a woman reported ever experiencing. There are 13 different acts of spousal
violence. Refer to Table 2.A.1 to see the individual components of spousal violence variables. Panel B reports the summary
statistics for controlling behavior displayed by husbands. Jealousy/accusation is an indicator for whether husband/partner
constantly expresses jealousy or accuses of infidelity. Control over social network takes value 1 if the husband does not permit to
meet or limits contact with friends, family, and relatives. Wealth in Panel C refers to asset based index calculated using Principal
Component Analysis. In this case, it takes 5 values - with 1 being poorest and 5 being richest.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics (MICS)
Mean SD N
Panel A: Age 1-14
In the past month experienced:
(any physical abuse) 0.516 0.500 5375
(any psychological abuse) 0.310 0.462 5379
Panel B: Child Time Use & Work (Hours); Age 5-17
In the past week, total hours worked in:
all activities 12.4 17.1 5055
economic activities 4.7 8.9 5047
hours spent in fetching water or
firewood 2.4 4.6 5047
domestic chores 5.3 7.3 5046
Panel C: Hazardous Child Labor; Age 5-17
In the past week, involved in
any activity that requires:
carrying heavy loads 0.275 0.447 5038
working with dangerous tools or
operating heavy machinery 0.0356 0.185 3650
Panel D: Other Variables; Age 1-17
Age of the child 9.158 4.936 6606
Age rank of the child 1.834 1.100 6606
No. of children<17 2.430 1.358 6606
Age of the father 39.35 10.06 6606
Age of the mother 35.10 9.245 6556
Father’s education (years) 8.186 6.382 4782
Mother’s education (years) 7.780 4.963 2699
Wealth 2.581 1.483 6606
Household’s size 5.552 2.167 6606
Female (child) 0.470 0.499 6606
Rural location 0.789 0.408 6606
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for MICS (2014) data. Panel A reports the summary statistics
for physical and psychological abusive child disciplining in past month. Panel B reports the summary statistics for total hours
that a child spent in various work activities outside/inside home in the past week. Panel C reports the summary statistics
for hazardous child labor where each variable is an indicator for whether the child was involved in particular activity in past
week. Wealth in Panel D refers to asset based index calculated using Principal Component Analysis. In this case, it takes 5
values - with 1 being poorest and 5 being richest.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Conflict Exposure




conflict aged<16 0.411 1.927 0 45.40 2406
MICS
Father’s exposure to
conflict aged<16 0.138 1.085 0 45.40 6606
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for conflict exposure for
fathers in MICS (2014) and husbands in DHS (2016). Conflict exposure denotes a man’s




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5: Effect of husband’s childhood conflict exposure on controlling
behavior toward wife
All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Jealousy/ accusation of unfaithfulness
Conflict exposure -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Obs. 1677 1677 1475 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.222 0.222 0.226 0.226
Panel B: Control over social network
Conflict exposure -0.018⇤⇤ -0.019⇤⇤ -0.019⇤ -0.019⇤
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Obs. 1675 1675 1472 1472
Mean Outcome. 0.155 0.155 0.152 0.152
Ethnicity FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Location FE X X X X
Region Trend X X
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure
denotes man’s (husband’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors
are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The
results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: woman’s age, household’s size, and wealth score. Variable
in Panel A is an indicator for whether husband/partner constantly expresses jealousy or accuses of infidelity
. Variable in Panel B takes value 1 if husband does not permit to meet or limits contact with friends, family
and relatives. The sample is restricted to women who were interviewed in the domestic violence module and
whose husbands were interviewed in the men module and have lived in the same place for more than 10 years.
Mean Outcome reports respective average value of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at
1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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Table 2.6: Effect of father’s childhood conflict exposure on abuse
experienced by his child
All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Physical abuse
Conflict exposure -0.013⇤⇤ -0.013⇤⇤ -0.013⇤⇤ -0.014⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Obs. 5368 5368 4278 4278
Mean Outcome. 0.516 0.516 0.536 0.536
Panel B: Psychological abuse
Conflict exposure -0.012⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤ -0.011⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Obs. 5372 5372 4282 4282
Mean Outcome. 0.310 0.310 0.338 0.338
Ethnicity FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Location FE X X X X
Region Trend X X
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict ex-
posure denotes man’s (father’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16.
Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from
different regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: gender, age and age
ranking among resident siblings of the child, total number of children less than 17 years of age in the
household, household’s size, wealth score, and mother’s age. Outcome variables in Panel A and B are
indicators that take value 1 if the child selected for child discipline module in MICS was subjected to
respective disciplining method in the household. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of
the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Effect of father’s conflict exposure on his child’s involvement
in hazardous labor
All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Work requires carrying heavy loads
Conflict exposure -0.021⇤ -0.019 -0.022⇤⇤ -0.020⇤
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Obs. 4989 4989 3918 3918
Mean Outcome. 0.275 0.275 0.322 0.322
Panel B: Work requires working with dangerous
tools/ operating heavy machinery
Conflict exposure -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Obs. 3619 3619 2660 2660
Mean Outcome. 0.036 0.036 0.041 0.041
Ethnicity FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Location FE X X X X
Region Trend X X
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure
denotes man’s (father’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard
errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different
regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: gender, age and age ranking
among resident siblings of the child, total number of children less than 17 years of age in the household,
household’s size, wealth score, and mother’s age. Outcome variables in Panel A and B are indicators
that take value 1 if the child selected for child labor module in MICS was engaged in respective
activities in past week. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of the dependent variables




Table 2.A.1: Construction of Variables (DHS)
Variable Components
Less Severe Physical Violence=1
If husband ever,
1) pushed/shook or threw something at you
2) slapped you
3) twisted your arm/pulled hair
4)punched you with fist or something else
Severe Physical Violence=1
If husband ever,
1) kicked, dragged or beat you
2) tried to choke or burn you on purpose
3) threatened/attacked you with knife/gun/weapons
Emotional Violence=1
If husband ever,
1) say something to humiliate you infront of others
2) threaten to hurt/harm you or someone you care
3) insult or make you feel bad about yourself
Sexual Violence=1
If husband ever,
1) physically forced to have sexual intercourse
2) physically forced to perform any sexual acts
3)forced with threats/other ways to perform sexual acts
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Table 2.A.2: Construction of Variables (MICS)
Variable Components
Panel A: Child Discipline Module
Physical abuse=1
If anyone in the household,
1) shook him/her
2) spanked, hit or slapped him/her on the bottom with bare hand
3) hit him/her on the bottom or elsewhere on the body with something like
a belt, hairbrush, stick, or other hard object
4) hit or slapped him/her on the face, head, or ears
5) hit or slapped him/hand on the hand, arm, or leg
6) beat him/her up, that is hit him/her over and over as hard as one could
Psychological abuse=1 ‘ If anyone in the household,1) called him/her dumb, lazy, or another name like that
Panel B: Child Labor Module
Economic work=1
If since last week, the child
1) did any work or help on his/her own or the household’s
plot/farm/food garden or looked after animals
2) helped in family business or relative’s business with or
without pay, or run his/her own business
3) produced or sold articles, handicrafts, clothes,
food or agricultural products
4) engaged in any other activity in return for income in cash or in kind,
even for only one hours
Fetch water/collect firewood=1 If since last week, the child fetched water or collected firewood for household use
Domestic work=1
If since last week, the child
1) shopped for household
2) repaired any household equipment
3) cooked or cleaned utensils or the house
4) washed clothes
5) cared for children
6) cared for the old or sick
7) other household tasks
Cleaning=1
If since last week, the child
1) cooked or cleaned utensils or the house
2) washed clothes
Caring=1
If since last week, the child
1) cared for children
2) cared for the old or sick
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Table 2.A.3: Summary Statistics: Outcomes and Controls (DHS)
Full Sample Rural
Mean SE N Mean SE N
Panel A: Intimate Partner Violence
No. of reported acts of
violence 0.933 2.178 1884 0.918 2.152 1619
Ever Experienced:
(any emotional violence) 0.123 0.328 1884 0.121 0.326 1619
(any less severe physical violence) 0.212 0.409 1884 0.211 0.408 1619
(any severe physical violence) 0.0987 0.298 1884 0.0994 0.299 1619
(any sexual violence) 0.0775 0.267 1884 0.0723 0.259 1619
Panel B: Controlling Behavior
Experienced:
(jealousy/accusation of unfaithfulness) 0.217 0.412 1883 0.221 0.415 1619
(control over social network) 0.155 0.362 1881 0.149 0.356 1616
Panel C: Other Variables
Age (Wife) 31.30 8.275 2422 31.22 8.354 2071
Age (Husband) 34.81 8.279 2422 34.66 8.357 2071
Wife’s education (years) 4.346 4.307 2422 4.072 2.230 2071
Husband’s education (years) 6.467 3.840 2422 6.294 3.845 2071
Household’s size 5.764 3.046 2422 5.834 3.107 2071
Wealth 2.966 1.386 2422 2.780 1.334 2071
Rural location 0.359 0.480 2422 0.417 0.493 2071
Panel D: Exposure Variable-Casualties/1000 population
Husband’s exposure to
conflict aged<16 0.411 1.927 2406 0.472 2.074 2063
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for DHS (2016) data. Panel A reports the summary
statistics for spousal violence. No. of reported acts of violence is a continuous variable and it is the total count of
different individual acts of spousal violence (physical, sexual, or emotional) that a woman reported ever experiencing.
There are 13 different acts of spousal violence. Refer to Table 2.A.1 to see the individual components of spousal violence
variables. Panel B reports the summary statistics for controlling behavior displayed by husbands. Jealousy/accusation
is an indicator for whether husband/partner constantly expresses jealousy or accuses of infidelity. Control over social
network takes value 1 if the husband does not permit to meet or limits contact with friends, family, and relatives.
Wealth in Panel C refers to asset based index calculated using Principal Component Analysis. In this case, it takes 5
values - with 1 being poorest and 5 being richest. Conflict exposure denotes a man’s exposure to no. casualties/1000
population between ages 0-16.
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Table 2.A.4: Summary Statistics: Outcomes and Controls (MICS)
Full Sample Rural
Mean SE N Mean SE N
Panel A: Age 1-17
In the past month experienced:
(any physical abuse) 0.516 0.500 5375 0.536 0.499 4285
(any psychological abuse) 0.310 0.462 5379 0.338 0.473 4289
Panel B: Child Time Use & Work (Hours); Age 5-17
In the past week, total hours worked in:
all activities 12.4 17.1 5055 14.1 17.8 2345
economic activities 4.7 8.9 5047 4.8 8.9 2342
hours spent in fetching water or
firewood 2.4 4.6 5047 2.7 4.8 2342
domestic chores 5.3 7.3 5046 6.6 7.9 2341
Panel C: Hazardous Child Labor; Age 5-17
In the past week, involved in
any activity that requires:
carrying heavy loads 0.275 0.447 5038 0.322 0.467 3953
working with dangerous tools or
operating heavy machinery 0.0356 0.185 3650 0.0411 0.198 2679
Panel C: Other Variables; Age 1-17
Age of the child 9.158 4.936 6606 9.068 4.920 5212
Age rank of the child 1.834 1.100 6606 1.902 1.129 5212
No. of children<17 2.430 1.358 6606 2.554 1.382 5212
Age of the father 39.35 10.06 6606 39.47 10.43 5212
Age of the mother 35.10 9.245 6556 35.32 9.584 5176
Father’s education (years) 8.186 6.382 4782 7.654 6.035 3586
Mother’s education (years) 7.780 4.963 2699 7.227 5.517 1770
Wealth 2.581 1.483 6606 2.184 1.263 5212
Household’s size 5.552 2.167 6606 5.680 2.160 5212
Female (child) 0.470 0.499 6606 0.484 0.500 5212
Rural location 0.789 0.408 6606 1 0 5212
Panel D: Exposure Variable-Casualties/1000 population
Father’s exposure to
conflict aged<16 0.138 1.085 6606 0.163 1.210 5212
Notes: Panel A reports the summary statistics for physical and psychological abusive child disciplining in past
month. Panel B reports the summary statistics for total hours that a child spent in various work activities out-
side/inside home in the past week. Panel C reports the summary statistics for hazardous child labor where each
variable is an indicator for whether the child was involved in particular activity in past week. Wealth in Panel D
refers to asset based index calculated using Principal Component Analysis. In this case, it takes 5 values - with 1










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.A.6: Effect of husband’s conflict exposure on wife’s experience of less severe
physical violence
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Pushed/ shook/
threw sth at you Panel B: Slapped you
Conflict exposure -0.016 -0.016 -0.031⇤⇤⇤ -0.030⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Obs. 1678 1475 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.115 0.114 0.201 0.200
Panel C: Twisted arm/
pulled hair
Panel D: Punched you with
fist or sth else
Conflict exposure -0.019⇤⇤ -0.020⇤⇤ -0.018⇤⇤ -0.018⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Obs. 1678 1475 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.094 0.095 0.084 0.083
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes man’s
(husband’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors are clustered by VDC
or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The outcome variables in Panels A-D are
indicators for if a woman ever experienced specified type of less severe physical violence perpetrated by her spouse. The
sample is restricted to women who were interviewed in the domestic violence module and whose husbands were interviewed
in the men module and have lived in the same place for more than 10 years. Mean Outcome reports respective average
value of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level
of significance.
Table 2.A.7: Effect of husband’s conflict exposure on wife’s experience of severe
physical violence
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Kicked/ dragged/
beat you
Panel B: Tried to choke/
burn you on purpose
Conflict exposure -0.025⇤⇤⇤ -0.024⇤⇤⇤ -0.011 -0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Obs. 1678 1475 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.100 0.098 0.032 0.030
Panel C: Threatened/ at-
tacked you with knife or gun
Conflict exposure -0.004 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012)
Obs. 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.016 0.017
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes man’s
(husband’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors are clustered by VDC
or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The outcome variables in Panels A-C are
indicators for if a woman ever experienced specified type of severe physical violence perpetrated by her spouse. The sample
is restricted to women who were interviewed in the domestic violence module and whose husbands were interviewed in the
men module and have lived in the same place for more than 10 years. Mean Outcome reports respective average value
of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of
significance.
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Table 2.A.8: Effect of husband’s conflict exposure on wife’s experience of sexual
violence
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Physically forced to
intercourse
Panel B: Physically forced to
perform sexual acts
Conflict exposure -0.023⇤⇤⇤ -0.022⇤⇤ -0.004 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 1678 1475 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.072 0.068 0.036 0.031
Panel C: Forced with threat
to sexual acts
Conflict exposure -0.013⇤ -0.013
(0.008) (0.008)
Obs. 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.027 0.026
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes man’s
(husband’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors are clustered by VDC
or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The outcome variables in Panels A-C are
indicators for if a woman ever experienced specified type of sexual violence perpetrated by her spouse. The sample is
restricted to women who were interviewed in the domestic violence module and whose husbands were interviewed in the
men module and have lived in the same place for more than 10 years. Mean Outcome reports respective average value
of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of
significance.
Table 2.A.9: Effect of husband’s conflict exposure on wife’s experience of emotional
violence
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Say sth to humili-
ate infront of others
Panel B: Threaten to hurt
you or someone you care
Conflict exposure -0.023⇤⇤⇤ -0.025⇤⇤⇤ -0.012 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Obs. 1678 1475 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.070 0.065 0.045 0.043
Panel C: Insult/make you
feel bad about yourself
Conflict exposure -0.009 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011)
Obs. 1678 1475
Mean Outcome. 0.083 0.082
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes man’s
(husband’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors are clustered by VDC
or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The outcome variables in Panels A-C are
indicators for if a woman ever experienced specified type of emotional violence perpetrated by her spouse. The sample is
restricted to women who were interviewed in the domestic violence module and whose husbands were interviewed in the
men module and have lived in the same place for more than 10 years. Mean Outcome reports respective average value
of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of
significance.
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Table 2.A.10: Effect of father’s childhood conflict exposure on abuse experienced by
his child
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Constructive discipline Panel B: Shouted/Yelled
Conflict exposure 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Obs. 5379 4287 5378 4287
Mean Outcome. 0.911 0.914 0.740 0.757
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes man’s
(father’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors are clustered by VDC
or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS.
Controls include: gender, age and age ranking among resident siblings of the child, total number of children less than
17 years of age in the household, household’s size, wealth score, and mother’s age. Outcome variables in Panel A
and B are indicators of whether the child selected for child discipline module in MICS was subjected to respective
disciplining method in the household. Constructive discipline in Panel A takes value 1 if disciplining the child involved
taking away privileges, explaining wrong behavior or giving him/her something else to do. Shouted/yelled in Panel
B takes value 1 if the child was shouted or yelled. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of the dependent

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.A.12: Effect of husband’s conflict exposure on wife’s experience of
controlling behavior
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict exposure at age Panel A: Any control-ling behavior
Panel B: Control over
social network
multicolumn5c<=18 -0.000 -0.000 -0.007 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
<=20 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Obs. 1678 1475 1675 1472
Mean Outcome. 0.326 0.326 0.155 0.152
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth,Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes
man’s (husband’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-18 and 0-20, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different
regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: woman’s age, household’s size, and wealth
score. Panel A is an indicator for whether husband/partner expresses jealousy, accuses of infidelity, does not
permit to meet family and friends and insists on knowing where the woman is at all times. Variable in Panel
B takes value 1 if husband does not permit to meet or limits contact with friends, family, and relatives. The
sample is restricted to women who were interviewed in the domestic violence module and whose husbands
were interviewed in the men module and have lived in the same place for more than 10 years. Mean Outcome
reports respective average value of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant
at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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Table 2.A.13: Effect of father’s childhood conflict exposure on abuse
experienced by his child
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict exposure at age: Panel A: Physical abuse Panel B: Psychological abuse
<=18 -0.012⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
<=20 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 5368 4278 5372 4282
Mean Outcome. 0.516 0.536 0.310 0.338
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes
man’s (father’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-18 and 0-20, respectively. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression.
The results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: gender, age and age ranking among resident siblings of
the child, total number of children less than 17 years of age in the household, household’s size, wealth score, and
mother’s age. Outcome variables in Panel A and B are indicators that take value 1 if the child selected for child
discipline module in MICS was subjected to respective disciplining method in the household. Mean Outcome
reports respective average value of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant
at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
Table 2.A.14: Effect of father’s childhood conflict exposure on child’s
involvement in hazardous labor
All Sample Rural All Sample Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict exposure at age Panel A: Work requires Panel B: Work requires
carrying heavy loads working with dangerous tools/
operating heavy machinery
<=18 -0.013 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
<=20 -0.014⇤⇤⇤ -0.012⇤⇤⇤ -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 4989 3918 3619 2660
Mean Outcome. 0.275 0.322 0.036 0.041
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes
man’s (father’s) exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-18 and 0-20, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The
results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: gender, age and age ranking among resident siblings of the child,
total number of children less than 17 years of age in the household, household’s size, wealth score, and mother’s
age. Outcome variables in Panel A and B are indicators that take value 1 if the child selected for child labor module
in MICS was engaged in respective activities in past week. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.A.16: Exposure to conflict and cohort
composition
All Sample Rural Urban
[1] [2] [3]
Panel A: Cohort fraction
Conflict exposure 0.000017 0.000017 0.001631
(0.000022) (0.000023) (0.001100)
Obs. 106098 104532 1566
Mean Outcome. 0.021 0.021 0.021
Panel B: Male cohort fraction
Conflict exposure -0.000024 -0.000023 0.002595
(0.000017) (0.000017) (0.001733)
Obs. 100588 99022 1566
Mean Outcome. 0.021 0.021 0.021
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients from regression
of birth-year cohort sizes (in fractions) on conflict exposure. Conflict expo-
sure denotes each birth year exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population
between ages 0-16, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or
municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression.
The results are estimated using OLS. All regressions include cohort and loca-
tion fixed effects. Each outcome variable is a fraction of birth-year cohort size
to total observed population in a location. Panel A includes overall birth-
year cohort size irrespective of gender whereas Panel B includes birth-year
cohort size for male only. These regressions use the 2011 census, restricting
to birth years 1980-2006. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of
the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2 investigated the long-run relationship between exposure to an armed
conflict in childhood and later-life perpetration of abuse and neglect against fam-
ily members in adulthood. The results suggest that exposure to conflict-related
events in childhood has a lasting impact on adult violent behavior. In particu-
lar, an increase in childhood conflict exposure leads to a decline in the likelihood
of perpetrating violence and abuse against family members. This chapter delves
deeper into the topic to find the mechanisms that underlie these empirical results.
I explore other dimensions of men’s lives like educational, labor market, and
marriage market outcomes. Education can directly change an individual’s beliefs
on family violence or can also affect labor market outcomes which can then impact
domestic violence or child labor outcomes (Erten and Keskin, 2017). Likewise,
marriage market outcomes can determine women’s bargaining power within the
household. If exposed men are also more likely to marry women who oppose any
form of family violence, we are more likely to observe a decline in the perpetration
of spousal violence. Additionally, a decrease in marital conflict due to assortative
matching can induce parents to be less abusive toward their children. Another
potential channel can be the change in attitude toward family violence due to
exposure to an adverse circumstance in childhood. Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004)
argue that the ability to cope with difficult situations early in like can make
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one fully appreciate family relationships and change one’s attitude toward violent
behavior. As a consequence of which, we can witness a lower perpetration of
abuse against family members in adulthood.
To identify the causal channels, I exploit spatial and temporal variation in
men’s childhood exposure to armed conflict at the village or municipality level.
To construct the childhood exposure variable, I take advantage of the information
on the exact month and the year of birth of individuals and the dates of conflict-
related events at the local level. Intuitively, I exploit the fact that individuals
born in the same month and year but in different localities were exposed to
varying intensities of armed-conflict. Likewise, those born in the same locality
but in different months and years were also exposed to conflict differentially. As
in Chapter 2, conflict exposure is defined as the number of victims per thousand
population in a village or a municipality from ages 0-16.
I find that men who are exposed to conflict during ages 0-16 are more likely
to be educated, to have completed secondary schooling, and to be currently em-
ployed in skilled non-agricultural occupations. They are also more likely to marry
women of similar age and their partners are more likely to have completed pri-
mary education. The most pertinent channel is the change in attitude toward
violence brought by the experience of armed-conflict in childhood. Exposed men
are less likely to say that wife-beating is justified in different situations. In other
words, exposure to a conflict environment in childhood might develop dis-taste
for using violence at home in later life. These results suggest that educational,
economic, and marriage market outcomes along with a change in attitude/beliefs
are all plausible explanations for my findings on family violence.
My results on the causal channels are as surprising as the results on family vi-
olence outcomes in Chapter 2. The sustained positive effects of childhood conflict
exposure on attitudes along with long-run educational and economic outcomes
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are on, first glance, counter-intuitive. Existing literature in economics, in fact,
documents negative effects of exposure to armed conflict on educational and la-
bor market outcomes (Akresh, 2008; Annan et al., 2011). However, psychology
literature suggests two potential reasons why we might observe the positive devel-
opments in educational, occupational, and attitude outcomes. Firstly, “resilience”
allows at-risk individuals to “bounce-back” or achieve better outcomes in situa-
tions where adverse results would be normally expected (Luthar et al., 2000). Sec-
ondly, challenging circumstances early in life can lead to “post-traumatic growth”
which often involves recognizing new possibilities, appreciating family and inti-
mate relationships (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004).
Next, I assess what the results on family violence and the channels imply about
theories of domestic violence. Existing theories highlight two broader motives for
perpetrating domestic violence: “Expressive” and “Instrumental”. Violence is in-
strumental if it is used to extract resources from the victim whereas it is expressive
if the perpetrator gains direct non-pecuniary (dis)utility from it. A special case
of instrumental violence is the traditional model of household bargaining (Aizer,
2010) which argues that an improvement in one’s bargaining power within the
household reduces the chances of experiencing domestic violence.
I start by exploring whether my empirical results support the instrumental
theories on domestic violence. Firstly, I do not find any significant effect of
conflict exposure on the wife’s bargaining power within the household. Secondly,
I find that wives of exposed men are more likely to work. This suggests that there
are greater incentives for men to use domestic violence to extract resources from
working wives. However, I find these men to be less violent, both physically and
sexually. Therefore, the evidence supporting instrumental theories of domestic
violence is very weak in this case. Nevertheless, I am unable to completely rule
out the instrumental motives - the reason being that, I also find exposed men
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are more likely to work which might it unnecessary to use violence to extract
resources from wives. My results on family violence are, however, consistent
with the expressive theories of domestic violence where men develop dis-taste for
perpetrating such behaviors. This argument is strengthened by the observed drop
in the perpetration of more expressive forms of abuse like sexual violence and the
positive change in men’s attitude toward domestic violence.
Related literature and contribution
This study is closely related to the literature in economics that explores “early
life” shocks and the formation of later life preferences and attitude. Evidence
from child-soldiering shows that childhood exposure to violence alters political
beliefs and increases political participation and community engagement later on
(Blattman, 2009; Adhvaryu et al., 2014). Additionally, girls abducted into com-
bating displayed high resilience and less aggressive social behavior later on despite
experiencing high psychological distress (Annan et al., 2011). However, evidence
on the effects of “early life” shocks on beliefs and attitude is mixed. Women who
were exposed to armed conflict in their childhood are more likely to normalize
the use of aggressive behavior by their partners(Mattina and Shemyakina, 2017).
This chapter complements previous studies on the role of early life shocks
in the formation of later life preferences and beliefs by providing evidence for
positive change in attitudes toward domestic violence. Additionally, unlike current
literature that studies armed-conflict and domestic violence, I find that conflict
exposure can reduce domestic violence if the potential perpetrator develops a
distaste for it. While doing so, I also provide empirical evidence for the theoretical
literature on intimate partner violence (Tauchen et al., 1991; Haushofer et al.,
2019) by determining underlying motives for domestic violence to be expressive.
The second strand of literature this chapter contributes to is the research on
the long-run effects of exposure to conflict or war on measures of human capital.
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Recent studies have documented that childhood exposure to armed conflict dis-
rupts schooling which has negative effects on educational achievements (Akresh,
2008; Shemyakina, 2011) and later life labor market outcomes (Blattman and
Annan, 2010; Annan et al., 2011). Additionally, exposure to war as a child has
a detrimental effect on adult health in terms of reduced stature (Akresh et al.,
2012a), higher Body-Mass Index (BMI), elevated incidence of chronic health con-
ditions (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2017), and increased psychological and mental distress
(Singhal, 2018). On the contrary, my results show that exposed children were
more likely to complete secondary schooling and marry women of their age in the
long-run. I, therefore, add to this literature by highlighting the potential role of
resilience which allows exposed individuals to catch up to or have better outcomes
than their non-exposed counterparts in the long run.
Finally, this chapter also relates to the first chapter of this dissertation. In
Chapter 1, we find that, in the short-run, periods of heightened conflict have
negative effects on the time allocated to work and education of boys. The short-
run results are consistent with the literature on the effects of violence on child-level
outcomes. However, Chapter 3 shows that the negative short-run effects on boys
get more than compensated in the long run which by itself is a unique result.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss the
main data sources that I use in this chapter. Section 3.3 lays out the empirical
strategy and Section 3.4 presents. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Data
To calculate childhood conflict exposure for men, I use the same Informal Sector
Service Center’s (INSEC) data on victims from the Nepalese Civil War (1996-
2006) as Chapter 2.1 The other data that I use to explore potential mechanisms
1Refer to Section 2.3.1 for further details on the microdata on civil war.
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for results on family violence are described in sections below.
3.2.1 Data on potential causal channels
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data
To study the effects of childhood conflict exposure on long-run educational,
economic, and marriage market outcomes, I use the DHS-2016 survey. I use the
Male Recode of the DHS that includes information on men who were surveyed
under the Man’s Questionnaire. This questionnaire was administered to all men
age 15-49 in the subsample of households selected for the survey. The Man’s
Questionnaire collected information on background characteristics including the
month and the year of birth. Additionally, male respondents were asked if they
agree that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife under various
circumstances to measure attitudes toward domestic violence.
A subsample of men under Male Recode can be matched to their respective
spouses who were surveyed under the Woman’s Questionnaire. This matched
data-set allows me to understand the effect of man’s childhood exposure on his
marriage market outcomes. Additionally, since women respondents were also
asked the same questions on attitudes toward domestic violence, I can also check
for whether exposed men are matched to partners with certain attitudes toward
domestic violence. To measure empowerment, DHS also asked women respon-
dents a series of questions on their participation in making household decisions.
Therefore, the matched-data set also allows me to study decision-making out-
comes between a husband and a wife.
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
To bolster the results from the DHS survey, I also use data from the Multiple
Indicator Cluster Survey, 2014. This is a cross-sectional survey designed to assess
the situation of children and women in Nepal and also covers a range of household
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characteristics including asset ownership. The Household Questionnaires includes
information on the birth and the year of month, and education of the household
members along with other household characteristics. The survey also adminis-
tered a separate questionnaire to all women aged 15-49 which included modules
on attitudes toward domestic violence.
Population Census of Nepal
In addition, I use the 2011 wave of Nepal’s national population census to
access local level birth cohorts size. In order to weight the number of victims by
village(or municipality) level population, I use the census wave of 2001.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
In this chapter, I exploit the same spatial and temporal variation in men’s child-
hood conflict exposure as in Chapter 2. To do so, I take advantage of the infor-
mation on the exact month and the year of birth of individuals and the dates of
conflict-related events at the village or municipality level. This information allows
me to construct more precisely how much conflict an individual was exposed to
up to the age of 16. To sum up, my empirical strategy is to exploit the fact that
the men born in the same month and year but in different localities were exposed
to varying intensities of armed- conflict. Likewise, those born in the same locality
but in different months and years were also exposed to conflict differentially. I
define childhood conflict exposure as victims per 1000 population in a village or
municipality up to the age of 16.
To formally examine the effects of conflict exposure in childhood, I estimate
the following specification:
Mimtl = ↵ +   exposureimtl + ✓
0
Xi +  l +  t + "imtl (3.1)
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where Mijmtl is an outcome variable for a man, i, who was born in month m of
year t and is living in location l at the time of the survey. Here, l can be a village
or a municipality which is Nepal’s second-lowest administrative units. The main
variable of interest, exposureimtl, is exposure to conflict, which is measured as the
number of casualties per thousand population in location l when i was between
ages 0 to 16. Xi is the set of household level controls like household size, wealth
score, and dummies for ethnicity variables.
The coefficient of interest,  , measures the effect of a unit increase in conflict
exposure on the outcome variable of interest. "imtl is the error term of the re-
gression model.   is identified under the assumption that the treatment variable,
exposureimtl, is not correlated to the unobservables in the error term (✏imtl). Some
localities have certain unobservable characteristics, like forest density, that might
make them more prone to guerrilla warfare. To control for such unobservable
location-specific characteristics, I include location fixed effects ( l). Likewise, I
also include fixed effects for man’s year of birth ( t) which controls for non-linear
time trends. In other words,  t controls for location-invariant unobservable char-
acteristics like attitudes, beliefs or norms common to individuals born in the same
year. Finally, I estimate all regressions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
cluster standard errors at the village or municipality level.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Education and labor market outcomes
Education can directly change an individual’s beliefs on family violence or can also
affect labor market outcomes which can then impact domestic violence or child
labor outcomes (Erten and Keskin, 2017). Unemployment and economic hardship
has been found to increase both spousal violence and child abuse (Schneider et al.,
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2016, 2017). If exposure to conflict in childhood had a significant impact on long-
run educational outcomes which then affected the economic conditions of men,
this could, in turn, affect the perpetration of violent behavior toward family.
I estimate if exposure to conflict at age less than 16 had any effect on male
educational attainment. The results are presented in Table 3.1. The outcome
variable in Panel A is years of education, and to study effects on long-run edu-
cation, I limit my sample to men aged 20 to 49 at the time of the survey. An
increase in experience of conflict intensity in childhood has a positive impact on
total years of education in both DHS and MICS surveys. The magnitude of co-
efficients is 0.058 for DHS (Column [1]) and 0.073 (Column [3]) for MICS which
is small compared to the sample mean of 6.73 and 7.19, respectively. The im-
pact is more significant and larger in size (compared to the sample mean) for the
probability of completing secondary education for exposed men as seen in Panel
B. As the standard age to complete secondary education in Nepal is of 16 years,
I include those men who are of age 18 or above in my sample. The coefficients
are positive and significant for both DHS and MICS samples, though smaller in
magnitude for the latter one.
There are two potential explanations for this surprising positive effect on long-
run male educational attainment. Firstly, as borrowed from the psychology liter-
ature, is the concept of “resilience". It refers to a dynamic process of achieving
positive adaptation despite major assaults on the developmental process due to
being exposed to a significant threat or severe adversity in childhood (Luthar
et al., 2000). That is, it allows at-risk individuals to achieve positively valued
outcomes in situations where adverse results would be normally expected due to
negative circumstances faced by them. In other words, resilience is the ability
to “bounce back". Positive outcomes despite adverse experiences are not unique
to Nepal’s civil war. After World-War II, getting good education and jobs was a
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way to make up for the lost ground for the affected Japanese population (Nagata
and Takeshita, 1998). However, many empirical studies also argue that positive
outcomes are stronger where cultural values like family ties, religion, and faith,
that form the bedrock of resilience are embodied strongly among the affected
population (Eggerman and Panter-Brick, 2010). Secondly, parents might have
invested more in the education of children who were adversely affected by war or
there might have been more local level post-war educational investment in areas
affected by war.
I also check whether exposure to conflict in childhood had a significant impact
on labor market outcomes. If resilience allowed exposed men to achieve better
educational outcomes, they might also have observed higher probability of finding
jobs. If true, improved labor market outcomes can translate to better financial
situations at home and increased ability to respond to wife and children’s needs.
Lower stress due to work opportunities can reduce the use of violence against
family members. I find that men who were exposed in childhood are more likely to
be employed in skilled non-agricultural work (Panel D). The estimated coefficient
is positive but not significant for the rural DHS sample.
Overall, these findings imply that men who were exposed to conflict in child-
hood are more likely to be educated, complete secondary schooling, and employed
in skilled non-agricultural jobs. As a result, these men are more likely to have fi-
nancial security along with better awareness about the negative impacts of family
violence. I interpret these findings as evidence for adult-life education and labor
market outcomes as channels for the estimated impacts of conflict exposure on
family violence.
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3.4.2 Attitude toward violent behavior
To explore further potential mechanisms, I investigate if exposure to adverse
situations in childhood alters the beliefs of men on the use of domestic violence.
Table 3.2 reports my findings for the effect of a man’s exposure to conflict from
ages 0-16 on his attitude toward wife-beating in certain situations. As seen in
Panel B, the coefficients for whether wife-beating is justified after an argument
is negative and statistically significant for both full and rural samples. Likewise,
conflict exposure is also negatively associated with the probability of saying wife-
beating is justified when she goes without telling the husband and if she refuses
to have sex. In fact, the coefficient for the variable “beating is justified if wife
refuses to have sex” is statistically significant for the rural samsple.2 Finally, in
Table 3.A.1, I increase the cut-off age for exposure to 18 and 20 years and re-
estimate equation 3.1 for all attitude variables. My coefficients are still negative
while statistical significance increases for many of them.3
This positive effect on attitude is evidence for how growing up in an adverse
environment can significantly affect behavior by altering the underlying prefer-
ences of an individual. A subset of the psychology literature on posttraumatic
growth developed by Tedeschi and Calhoun argues that large adverse shocks tend
to have a persistent effect on one’s outlook on life and attitude. As pointed out by
Voors et al. (2012), this is what we know in economics as preferences. According
to Post-traumatic Growth Theory, struggle with highly stressful and challeng-
ing life crises can lead to an experience of positive change afterward known as
“post-traumatic growth". In fact, only a minority of people exposed to traumatic
2 Interestingly childhood exposure to conflict has a positive association with the probability
of justifying beating when wife neglects children. Though the coefficients reported on Panel D
are not significant, this might be an indication that men value child welfare over spousal welfare.
3Increase in education can also potentially explain the change in attitude toward violent
behavior. However, Erten and Keskin (2017) find that educational reform in Turkey increased
years of schooling of rural women but did not change domestic violence attitudes.
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events develop longstanding psychiatric disorders while others have a newfound
sense of personal strength. (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004). Post-traumatic growth
often involves a new appreciation for life, family and intimate relationships, and
spiritual development. As a result of which, a person develops more intimacy in
personal relationships.
The positive change in attitude toward wife beating after being exposed to
armed conflict in childhood is an example of this growth. My findings on attitude
are similar to evidence from child soldiering and highly exposed cohort which
shows that childhood exposure to violence alters political beliefs and increases
political participation and community engagement later on (Blattman (2009),
Adhvaryu et al. (2014)). Additionally, girls abducted into combating displayed
high resilience and less aggressive social behavior later on despite experiencing
high psychological distress (Annan et al., 2011). Taken together, post-traumatic
growth and resilience discussed in section 3.4.1 can potentially explain how ex-
posed men whose childhood schooling might have been interrupted can catch up
and in-fact surpass the outcomes of unexposed men.
I interpret the change in male attitude toward wide beating brought by the
experience of armed-conflict in childhood, especially for the rural population, as
a mechanism driving earlier results on spousal violence. Additionally, it can also
explain the negative association between father’s exposure to conflict and the
use of violence against his children. Men who prefer not to perpetrate spousal
violence are also less likely to implement violent child disciplining methods.
3.4.3 Marriage market outcomes
Marriage market outcomes might be another channel through which conflict expo-
sure can impact family violence. If exposed men, with more education, are likely
to marry more educated women than unexposed men, then this is likely to affect
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the outcomes. Educated women are more likely to oppose any form of spousal
violence and disapprove of the use of physical violence to discipline their children.
They might enjoy higher bargaining status in the relationship which reduces their
risk of experiencing violence (Aizer, 2010). Better labor market outcomes of ed-
ucated women can lead to mothers investing more in their children and hence,
can reduce child labor. Additionally, education and the age gap between spouses
might impact marital conflict and decisions on child-rearing.
To investigate this mechanism, I estimate the effect of a man’s exposure to
conflict in his childhood to his marriage market outcomes. The results of these
estimations are presented in Table 3.3. I first start with the spousal age difference.
A larger age gap between a husband and a wife is often considered to result in
power imbalances in the relationship. A relatively younger wife might have less
bargaining power when it comes to making decisions regarding her children or
her own marital status. Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that, for the DHS sample,
the age gap (in years) between spouses is reduced by approximately 30 days, or 2
percent of the sample mean. However, I get insignificant coefficients for the MICS
sample. I also check for whether exposed men are likely to marry at later ages.
The results on Panel B provides no evidence for the effect of conflict exposure on
marriage age of the man.
Panel C of the table reports results for the educational status of spouses of
exposed men. For both DHS and MICS samples, conflict exposure in childhood
increases the probability of exposed men marrying partners who have completed
primary education. I also check for whether exposure to conflict affects spousal
education differences. If exposed men are more likely to marry women who have
achieved a similar level of formal education, they are less likely to have marital
conflict. A healthy relationship can, in fact, lead to less stress and reduction
in the use of family violence. As seen in Panel D, though conflict exposure and
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spousal education difference are negatively related, the reported estimates are not
statistically significant. Finally, the results in Panel E show that exposed men
are more likely to have spouses who are currently working.
These findings imply that exposed men marry “higher-quality” partners who
are more educated and currently working. Reduction in the spousal age gap
can also be another potential channel, though the evidence for this mechanism
is weak. Altogether, partner characteristics and marriage market outcomes are
likely operative channels driving my results on family violence.
Wife’s bargaining power
Better educated women are more likely to have higher bargaining power as
their options outside the marriage increases. Previous empirical studies have
shown that women’s involvement in the labor market reduces their experiences of
domestic violence through an increase in their bargaining power (Aizer, 2010).
In the DHS, there are questions on decision making that aim to measure bar-
gaining power within a household. I take the responses to the decision making
questions as suggestive evidence of bargaining outcome. If marriage market out-
comes are affecting perpetration of spousal violence by men through the bargain-
ing channel, we should expect spouses of exposed men to have more favorable
decision-making outcomes. Therefore, I check for whether there is any effect of
the husband’s conflict exposure on the bargaining outcomes of his wife. The
results for various decision-making outcomes are presented in Table 3.7. I fail
to find any positive significant effects of man’s conflict exposure on a variety of
household decisions made by his wife. In fact, as seen in Column 3 of Panel H,
the only negative significant effect is on whether a woman has any say on how her
husband’s income should be spent. These results suggest that marriage market
outcomes of exposed men do not affect their perpetration of domestic violence
through intra-household bargaining.
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Wife’s attitude toward domestic violence
As discussed earlier, the characteristics of spouses of conflict exposed men may
be different from those who were not exposed. One of the characteristics that
matter in this context is the wife’s attitude toward domestic violence. Educated
women are more likely to disapprove of the use of physical and other coercive
forms of violence. I explore this potential mechanism by testing whether exposed
men are more likely to marry women who do not justify wife-beating. Tables
3.4 and 3.5 report results on wife’s attitude toward domestic for DHS and MICS
samples, respectively. Even though exposed men are more likely to have spouses
who have completed primary school, I find no evidence that these women are
less likely to justify domestic violence. Therefore, the wife’s attitude toward
domestic violence is not the mechanism at play here. This along with the results
on bargaining outcomes suggests that the likelihood of marrying more educated
spouses is operating through other ways like reducing marital conflict.
3.4.4 Other channels: Mother’s experience of spousal vio-
lence
The psychology literature often points towards family systems theory which
argues that negative aspects of one kind of relationship within a family can ad-
versely affect another relationship (Lutenbacher et al. (2004), Margolin and Gordis
(2003)). For instance, mothers affected by spousal violence are also more likely to
be physically abusive and to demonstrate verbal aggression toward their children.
This suggests that my finding of husband’s conflict exposure in childhood decreas-
ing spousal violence could serve as a mechanism for the decrease in child abuse.
Given that I do not know who perpetrates violent child disciplining practices
within a household, it is plausible to assume that the abuser could be the mother.
Therefore, any changes in the mother’s outcomes can have positive effects on her
child’s outcome. As wives of exposed men are less likely to experience spousal
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abuse, they can develop healthy family relationships which can then change their
parenting attitude. As mothers are less likely to implement harsh parenting tech-
niques, the probability of their children getting abused and neglected also goes
down.
3.5 Theories on domestic violence
Next, I assess what the results on family violence and the channels imply about
theories on domestic violence. Existing theories highlight two broader motives
for perpetrating domestic violence: “Expressive” and “Instrumental”. Domestic
violence is expressive if the man perpetrating it gains direct utility and non-
pecuniary benefits by making it a channel to express his anger or frustration.
The gain (loss) in utility can be positive if violence is “expressively pleasurable"
or negative if it is “expressively distasteful” (Haushofer et al., 2019).
Any form of domestic violence is instrumental if it is used to extract resources
or monetary transfers from the victims. A common assumption in instrumental
theories is that domestic violence perpetrated by a male partner depends on
his spouse’s outside options, often denoted as her “participation constraint”. In
societies, like Nepal, where divorce is strongly stigmatized with high social costs of
leaving the marriage, a woman’s outside options are limited. This provides greater
incentives for husbands to use more violence to gain control. A special case of
instrumental violence is the traditional model of household bargaining (Aizer,
2010) which argues that an improvement in one’s bargaining power within the
household reduces the chances of experiencing domestic violence.
Theories on domestic violence, as per my knowledge, do not study motives for
perpetrating child abuse. Mainly, children do not have outside options and are
obliged to stay with their parents. Imposing a participation constraint in this
scenario does not seem to be plausible. The best way to use existing theories
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to explain child abuse is to compare children to women for whom divorce is not
an option. In this scenario, parents can use the unconstrained level of violence
to extract resources or services from their children in the form of child labor.
However, results in Table 3.6 show that the father’s conflict exposure decreases
the time allocated to various activities by his child. Unfortunately, this decrease in
child work hours does not help us to exactly disentangle whether the motive here
is “instrumental” or “expressive”. Since exposed men are more likely to complete
secondary education and work more in skilled labor (Section 3.4.1), they are also
likely to have a better source of income. This might make it unnecessary to use
violence to extract resources and services from their children. As a result of which
child time allocation in other activities goes down. At the same time, it can be
expressive if fathers develop a distaste for violent behavior and value child welfare.
To understand the underlying motives, I check for woman’s work and bargain-
ing status within the household. The results from an exposed man’s marriage
market outcomes (Section 3.4.3) tell us that they are more likely to be married
to a woman who currently reports working. If men use violence instrumentally,
we would expect working women to be abused more as more resources can be
extracted from her. However, in this scenario, women report experiencing less
of all kinds of spousal violence. Nevertheless, instrumental theories of violence
also illustrate that men can use non-violent threats or spousal control, instead of
domestic violence, to extract resources or transfers from women (Bobonis et al.,
2013). In this case, one can still observe actual physical abuse going down. In
Section 2.5.2, I find evidence for less controlling behavior displayed by exposed
men. Similarly, in Section 2.5.1, there is evidence for the decrease in the perpe-
tration of emotional abuse (which also includes threat), especially for the rural
sample.
Instrumental theories also suggest that an increase in bargaining power re-
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duces the chances of experiencing spousal violence. However, Table 3.7 shows
that there are no positive significant effects of man’s conflict exposure on a vari-
ety of household decisions made by his wife.4 Taken together, the empirical results
are inconsistent with the instrumental theories on household bargaining. Never-
theless, men who were exposed to conflict are more likely to work (Section 3.4.1)
which might make using violence to extract resources unnecessary. Therefore,
I cannot completely rule out other instrumental motives for domestic violence,
though the evidence supporting this theory is weak.
My results on domestic violence resonate more with the expressive theories
of domestic violence. As Haushofer et al. (2019) pointed out, though physical
violence can be either instrumental or expressive, sexual violence is used expres-
sively. They also point out, in cases where men are likely to have more income but
at the same time decrease the use of physical violence, violence though used in-
strumentally is “expressively distasteful". Additionally, I also find strong support
for the decline in the perpetration of sexual violence by men who were exposed
from ages 0-16. Furthermore, the argument that family violence in this context
is expressive is strengthened by the improvement in men’s attitude toward do-
mestic violence. As observed in Section 3.4.2, exposure to conflict in childhood
decreases the probability of justifying the use of domestic violence, hence making
it “expressively distasteful”.
4The only significant effect is on whether the wife has any say on spending husband’s income.
As childhood conflict exposure increases for a man, his wife is less likely to have decision-making
power when it comes to his income. In other words, conflict exposure is positively associated
with men having more private information on their own income. According to Bobonis et al.
(2013), when men are likely to have more private information on their own resources, they can
use violence instrumentally to seek transfer or rent from their spouses. Evidence provided on
earlier sections show that this is not likely to be the case here.
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3.6 Conclusion
In Chapter 2, I find that a man’s exposure to the Nepalese Civil War (1996-2006)
in childhood reduces the likelihood of the perpetration of spousal violence. Ad-
ditionally, children of exposed fathers experience less physical and psychological
abuse; they are also less likely to be working in hazardous forms of child labor.
To understand what drives these long-lasting positive impacts of a negative ex-
perience in childhood, this chapter investigates several channels.
I find that men who are exposed to conflict from ages 0-16 are more likely
to complete secondary schooling and to work in skilled non-agricultural occu-
pations. Another pertinent mechanism here is the change in attitude toward
violence brought by exposure to traumatic and stressful events in childhood. In
other words, exposure to the conflict environment in childhood might develop
dis-taste for using violence at home. Finally, exposed men are also more likely to
marry women of their age and their partners are more likely to complete primary
schooling which might be partially driving the outcomes. Analyzing the impli-
cations of empirical results for the theories on domestic violence, I find that the
underlying motive for family violence is “expressive"; i.e., exposed men receive
non-pecuniary dis-utility from perpetrating violence at home. This also indicates
that preferences, observed through behavior, are endogenous and likely to be
dependent on life experiences.
My results have important policy implications. Different underlying motives
for engaging in family violence require different policy interventions. For instance,
if the motive for family violence is purely instrumental, then policies that improve
women’s outside options (bargaining power), such that the threat of leaving the
marriage is more credible, might be more appropriate. In this paper, the mo-
tive for family violence is more expressive. Therefore, policies that target to alter
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preferences and subsequently behaviors, like television programs or street theater,
might be more effective. For example, significant improvement in knowledge and
attitude toward HIV and risky sexual behavior was found after the implementa-
tion of entertaining educational TV series (edutainment programs) in Nigeria
(Banerjee et al., 2019). Most of the time, when violence is both instrumental and
expressive, we might need policies that are a mixed bag of the above-mentioned
options. Finally, the positive long-run educational, occupational, attitude, and
marriage market outcomes show that people affected by adverse circumstances can
“bounce-back” and achieve outcomes similar to their unexposed peers. Therefore,
there is a potential for policies to be built around people’s resilience to various




Table 3.1: Effect of conflict exposure on educational attainment & work status
DHS MICS
All Rural All Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Years of education
Conflict exposure 0.058⇤⇤ 0.044 0.073⇤ 0.075⇤
(0.029) (0.028) (0.044) (0.045)
Obs. 2708 2341 9649 7138
Mean Outcome. 6.730 6.568 7.190 6.506
Panel B: Completed secondary education
Conflict exposure 0.013⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 3010 2597 10757 7974
Mean Outcome. 0.348 0.324 0.350 0.280
Panel C: Worked in past 12 months
Conflict exposure 0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Obs. 3517 3043
Mean Outcome. 0.862 0.869
Panel D: Skilled manual/non-manual work (non-agriculture)
Conflict exposure 0.004⇤⇤ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 3517 3043
Mean Outcome. 0.401 0.377
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes
man’s exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors are clustered by VDC
or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using
OLS. Controls include: household’s size, and wealth score. Outcome variable in Panel A is the total number of
years of education and whereas in Panel B is an indicator for completing secondary education. Panel C is an
indicator for whether the respondent worked in past 12 months. Finally, outcome variable in Panel D takes value
1 if the respondent worked in skilled (manual or non-manual) non-agricultural job in past 12 months. The sample
is restricted to men who have lived in the same place for more than 10 years for the DHS sample. Information
on work status is not available for the MICS sample. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Effect of conflict exposure on marriage market outcomes
DHS MICS
All Rural All Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Spousal age gap
Conflict exposure -0.073⇤⇤ -0.078⇤⇤ -0.001 0.009
(0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Obs. 2376 2080 7082 5459
Mean Outcome. 3.474 3.384 3.426 3.307
Panel B: Age when first married
Conflict exposure 0.007 0.006
(0.030) (0.033)
Obs. 2404 2103
Mean Outcome. 20.634 20.454
Panel C: Wife completed primary education
Conflict exposure 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤ 0.009⇤ 0.008⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Obs. 2171 1893 7082 5459
Mean Outcome. 0.451 0.427 0.393 0.327
Panel D: Education gap
Conflict exposure -0.015 -0.021 -0.041 -0.031
(0.038) (0.040) (0.036) (0.034)
Obs. 2171 1893 7056 5442
Mean Outcome. 0.451 0.427 2.649 2.852
Panel E: Wife currently working
Conflict exposure 0.012⇤⇤ 0.011⇤
(0.006) (0.006)
Obs. 2171 1893
Mean Outcome. 0.622 0.634
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes
man’s exposure to no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-16. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or
municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS.
Controls include: woman’s age (for Panels C & D), household’s size, and wealth score. Outcome variable in Panel
A is the difference in age between spouses. Outcome in Panel B is man’s age at first marriage. The dependent
variable in Panel C is an indicator for whether wife has completed primary education. Finally, Panel D is the
difference in years of education between husband and wife and Panel E is an indicator for whether wife is currently
working or not. The sample is restricted to men who have lived in the same place for more than 10 years for the
DHS sample. Information on age of first marriage and wife’s current work status is not available for the MICS
survey. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.A.1: Effect of conflict exposure on attitude toward wife beating
All Rural All Rural
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Conflict exposure at age: Panel A: No. of situations wifebeating is justified
Panel B: Beating justified if wife
argues
<=18 -0.010⇤ -0.011⇤ -0.006⇤⇤⇤ -0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
<=20 -0.011⇤ -0.012⇤ -0.006⇤⇤⇤ -0.007⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 3517 3043 3512 3038
Mean Outcome. 0.482 0.500 0.103 0.106
Conflict exposure at age: Panel C: Beating justified if wifegoes w/o telling him
Panel D: Beating justified if she
refuses to have sex
<=18 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003⇤ -0.003⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
<=20 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 3513 3040 3503 3030
Mean Outcome. 0.105 0.112 0.043 0.047






Mean Outcome. 0.209 0.214
Additional Regressors: Year of Birth, Ethnicity & Location Fixed Effects: Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients ( ) from specification 3.1. Conflict exposure denotes man’s exposure to
no. of casualties/1000 population between ages 0-1y and 0-20, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality
of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: household’s
size, and wealth score. Outcome variable in Panel A is the total number of situations a man aged 15-49 surveyed in the DHS
man’s survey agreed that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife. Variables in Panels B-E are indicators for if the man
answered wife beating is justified for that specific reason. The sample is restricted to men who have lived in the same place for more
than 10 years. Mean Outcome reports respective average value of the dependent variables in this sample. *** Significant at 1%, **
Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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